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I. INTRODUCTION
Few problems are more disruptive to the efficient negotia-
tion and operation of comprehensive mass tort settlements than
oversubscription, which, at times, appears to be fueled primarily by
specious claims. In settlements with opt-out rights, a flood of
claims can generate a market for lemons, with the weakest claims
submitted to the settlement and the strongest opting out and seek-
ing recovery at trial or in private settlement. In binding settle-
ments, oversubscription may result in a common problem, requir-
ing dramatic reductions in payment that effectively transfer recov-
eries from those with intrinsically strong claims to those with weak
claims.
Why are some comprehensive mass tort settlements over-
run by specious claims? At first glance, the question suggests rela-
tively straightforward answers: greed, the unethical schemes of a
few plaintiffs that are "bad apples," and the inability or unwilling-
ness of courts and defendants to challenge them. Thus, payment of
specious claims is merely another cost of settlementI and the "bad
1. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Optimal Pooling in Claim Resolution Facilities,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160 (1990), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fsspapers/1541 ("The adverse selection of
frivolous claimants represents an important transaction cost of claims facilities
that non-frivolous claimants must bear.").
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apples" who submit them clearly recognize that it will cost settle-
ment administrators more to uncover than it will to simply pay the
claims.
Without rejecting the bad apple explanation entirely, the
available evidence suggests that specious claims within some mass
torts are more complex than this explanation suggests. Specious
filings have overwhelmed not only those settlements where ad-
vancing frivolous claims is rational, but also those where private
self-interest should, in theory, discourage them. 2 In these cases,
the vast majority of questionable claims were recruited, developed,
and advanced by groups of repeat players following a streamlined
and compartmentalized model of litigation. And, as in other group
settings with comparable patterns of collective misconduct,3 the
fact that many participants are strikingly ordinary and otherwise
ethical, law-abiding actors indicates that the bad apple rationale is,
at best, incomplete. 4
In order to address this question in greater detail, Part II of
this Article provides a descriptive account of the entrepreneurial
2. See infra Part II.C.
3. See JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE:
UNDERSTANDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 178 (4th Ed. 1998) ("Almost all [of]
the studies have agreed on one point: White-collar offenders are psychological-
ly 'normal' . . . ."); Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of
Corruption in Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 5 (2003)
(proposing a model that offers an explanation why "otherwise morally upright
individuals . . . routinely engage in corruption without experiencing conflict");
Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos et al., Rationalization, Overcompensation and the Es-
calation of Corruption in Organizations, 84 J. Bus. ETHICs. 65, 65 (2009)
("While voracious ambition and greed certainly played a role in the [corporate]
corruption noted, most of the perpetrators were otherwise law abiding and re-
spectful citizens.").
4. See Zyglidopoulos et al., supra note 3, at 65 (noting that, given the
large number of otherwise law abiding citizens involved in corporate scandals,
"the bad individual theory of corruption (enacted by evil characters) falls some-
what flat, indicating that self-deception and rationalization played a major role
in justifying the practices"). See generally Niki A. Den Nieuwenboer & Muel
Kaptein, Spiraling Down into Corruption: A Dynamic Analysis of the Social
Identity Processes that Cause Corruption in Organizations to Grow, 83 J. Bus.
ETH. 133 (2008) (discussing the process by which group corruption evolves
notwithstanding low base rate for corruption in organizations).
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claim markets5 that generated specious claims in three high profile
mass tort litigation contexts: asbestos litigation, silica litigation,
and fen-phen litigation. Although frivolous claims appear in a
wide variety of litigation and claim resolution settings, these cases
were selected due to the volume of specious claims advanced and
the availability of claim development and filing information that is
not commonly accessible in mass tort litigation and settlement.
The discussion not only identifies the specific practices that gener-
ated large volumes of dubious claims, but also places them in the
context of the litigation and settlement environments in which they
arose.
With the benefit of this experience, Part III identifies some
distinguishing characteristics of the specious claim markets dis-
cussed in the case studies. Although commonly viewed by com-
mentators as an adverse selection problem in which claim quality
and value are fixed-but hidden-types, 6 this discussion evaluates
the extent to which comprehensive "going forward" settlements7
5. As used in this Article, the term "claim markets" refers to the markets
for mass tort client recruiting and claim development services. Participants in
these markets include law firms that primarily, if not exclusively, recruit new
clients and refer them to larger firms for litigation and settlement, medical
screening companies and doctors who generate the medical reports required to
advance the claims, and outside litigation support organizations that assist law-
yers in managing client information and preparing claim submissions. The term
"specious claim markets" similarly refers to those claim markets in which the
methods used to recruit and develop claims generate superficially plausible, but
ultimately unreliable or intentionally misleading, evidentiary support.
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF
SETTLEMENT 145 (2007) (discussing the classic adverse selection problem in
settlement design); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 688 (1989) ("Unlike most torts where not every indi-
vidual harmed seeks legal redress, mature mass torts generate an overabundance
of plaintiffs through widespread publicity, including a substantial number of
false positive claims.").
7. Although we often envision settlements as covering claims that have
already been advanced, some of the largest global settlements are established to
process and pay both existing claims and any new claims that may arise going
forward. These "going forward" settlements may have a limited window for
accepting new claims, but others-including substantially all asbestos bankrupt-
cy trusts-are designed to accept newly filed claims years or even decades after
they are established. These settlements tend to establish a compensation grid,
which categorizes current and future claims submitted by a range of factors-
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may encourage practices that resemble claim manufacturing rather
than fact development and yield circumstances in which rational
ignorance prevails both at the group and individual level among
repeat players. Even to the extent that some participants may have
opportunities or obligations to identify and prevent specious claim
development practices, compartmentalization of responsibility and
cognitive justifications that tend to neutralize comparable concerns
in other settings work in much the same way in entrepreneurial
mass tort claim development. This presents not only problems for
ethical enforcement, but also suggests that merely escalating the
risk of discovery and severity of individual sanctions may not be as
effective as conventional wisdom suggests.
With this basic framework in mind, Part IV evaluates the
potential for future specious claim markets in modem aggregate
litigation and advances proposals for controlling these markets in
collective settlements. This Part demonstrates that settlements
susceptible to targeted development require more sophisticated
provisions that address the opportunity, incentive, and neutraliza-
tion patterns that fuel specious claim markets. Specifically, this
Part emphasizes the need to ensure that deterrence messages reach
the appropriate individuals and sub-groups, identify and target
group incentives to advance specious claims, and manage their
opportunities to do so. Although others have suggested the use of
statistical methods to frame mass tort settlement values, this Part
explains that these methods may be more valuable in controlling
oversubscription and specious claim filings against claim resolu-
tion facilities post-settlement and outlines how these methods may
be effectively employed in this context. To that end, this discus-
sion provides a general framework for settlement criteria, proposes
an adaptive audit approach to monitoring claims in going forward
collective settlements, and suggests a more active role for courts in
settlement planning.
II. THREE STUDIES IN SPECIOUS CLAIM MARKETS
The three cases analyzed below-regarding asbestos litiga-
tion, silica litigation, and fen-phen litigation-present distinct sce-
i.e., type and severity of injury, level of exposure to a harmful product or event,
et cetera-and assigns settlement values to each category.
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narios in which an overwhelming mass of specious claims flooded
courts or comprehensive settlements. Although there may never be
another mass tort that possesses all of the factors that have compli-
cated asbestos personal injury litigation-including the long laten-
cy period between exposure and manifestation of an injury, unique
association with a horrific disease, sheer volume of potential vic-
tims, shocking misconduct by key defendants and defendant elas-
ticity-it nonetheless provides a useful study of the impact of judi-
cial management and settlement expectations on private behavior.
Likewise, the silica litigation provides a helpful point of compari-
son to asbestos litigation even though the specious claim market
there never gained an effective foothold. The fen-phen case is per-
haps most interesting because it challenges our expectations con-
cerning the propensity for specious claims to arise where discovery
seems likely and sanctions are potentially severe.
A. Specious Claim Markets in Asbestos Litigation and Settlement
Asbestos litigation has been aptly characterized as both the
"mother of all mass torts" and the "mother of invention" due to the
special problems it posed for courts.8 Its history has been marked
by a series of judicial experiments, both in substantive and proce-
dural law, across individual states and in federal courts. This his-
tory also makes asbestos litigation an ideal starting point for this
discussion.
1. The Historical Litigation and Settlement Environment in
Asbestos Litigation
To appreciate the manner in which asbestos litigation
evolved, it is helpful to understand the problems it created for
courts. The long latency period between exposure to airborne as-
bestos fibers and the onset of asbestos-related disease made identi-
fying the sources of the plaintiffs' asbestos exposure difficult. 9
8. See Alex J. Grant, Note, When Does the Clock Start Ticking?: Apply-
ing the Statute of Limitations in Asbestos Property Damage Actions, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 695, 696 (1995).
9. See Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Future of Mass Torts,
12 CONN. INs. L.J. 505, 506 (2006) ("The unusually long latency periods associ-
ated with asbestos-related illnesses both multiplied the number of such claimants
Vol. 42564
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Though many who are exposed to asbestos and develop markers
suggesting physiological damage from this exposure may not be-
come impaired until years later, they might be barred from pursu-
ing litigation if they wait until this impairment occurs.o In the
interim, potential claimants would be forced to bear the financial
burden of regular medical screening and the personal costs of liv-
ing in the shadow of potentially developing debilitating or even
terminal asbestos-related diseases.
Some courts sought to reduce the barriers to recovery, ena-
ble plaintiffs to preserve their rights, and shift costs from those
exposed to asbestos to those responsible for the exposure through a
variety of changes that have been characterized as "special asbes-
tos law."" These modifications include recognizing physiological
changes as compensable harms even where the plaintiff has no
discernible impairment, relaxing evidentiary burdens to account for
the long latency period of asbestos disease, and embracing plain-
and increased the difficulty of product (and hence defendant) identification,
necessitating some evidentiary innovations in order to facilitate the claims.").
10. See In re Asbestos Cases, 586 N.E.2d 521, 523 (111. App. Ct. 1991)
(noting many plaintiffs with little or no disability or impairment had filed asbes-
tos lawsuits because they feared being barred by statute of limitations); Richard
L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 858, 871 n.72 (1995) ("[I]n the current tort system, an indi-
vidual who has been exposed to asbestos and who exhibits even minor x-ray
changes must generally file suit promptly or face the bar of the statute of limita-
tions." (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum in Support of the Joint
Motion of the Settling Parties for Approval of Notice to the Class at 50,
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 93-CV-
0215))).
11. See Lester Brickman, Disparities Between Asbestosis and Silicosis
Claims Generated by Litigation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 CARDOZO
L. REv. 513, 515-518 (2007) [hereinafter Brickman, Disparities]; Lester Brick-
man, On the Applicability of the Silica MDL Proceeding to Asbestos Litigation,
12 CONN. INS. L.J. 289, 292 (2006) [hereinafter Brickman, Silica MDL]; Lester
Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Discon-
nect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 33, 54-59 (2003) [here-
inafter Brickman, Disconnect]; Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis:
Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDoZO L. REV. 1819,
1840-52 (1992); Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unin-
tended Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline the
Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 Miss. L.J. 531, 536 (2001).
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tiff-friendly adjustments to the calculation of damages.12 As a re-
sult, many claims that would not be compensable in typical per-
sonal injury cases-e.g., those lacking sufficient evidence to estab-
lish specific causation-could now go before a jury and be com-
pensable.13
Beyond the expansion of substantive law, the prevalence of
"shotgun complaints" and relaxed venue and joinder rules in some
jurisdictions generated amorphous consolidations of vague and
indistinguishable claims. Plaintiffs with no connection to the fo-
rum state or only speculative, tangential ties to the forum were
nonetheless allowed to join in cases with in-state plaintiffs.14 The-
se complaints often provided notice of the basic facts of the plain-
tiffs' respective cases in name only.
12. See Brickman, Disconnect, supra note 11, at 56-58; see also James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Expo-
sure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitor-
ing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 817-18 (2002) (noting the "radical departures from
longstanding norms of tort law" allowing pre-injury claims to obtain recovery).
13. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass
Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961,
1046 (1993) (noting substantial, yet highly subjective, damages have been
awarded based on estimates of future medical expenses and plaintiffs' concern
about their fate).
14. See JENNIFER L. BIGGS ET AL., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW
OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND TRENDS 15-16 (2007) available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbestos aug07.pdf (noting broad discre-
tion plaintiffs have enjoyed in filin in the forum of their choice).
15. See generally Joe E. Basenberg & S. Leanna Bankester, Notice
Pleading in the Mass Tort Arena: What Is Sufficient Notice?, 68 ALA. LAW. 74,
74-76 (2007) (describing the use in mass tort actions of "shotgun complaints"
that often evidence a lack of factual and legal inquiry by plaintiffs). As one
court noted, quoting an attorney from a prominent plaintiffs' firm:
It has been [their] practice over the many years of this consol-
idated litigation in New York Supreme Court, which has in-
volved thousand[s] of asbestos personal injury suits, to file a
Standard Asbestos Complaint against a general list of numer-
ous (currently approximately 100) defendants, which have
been identified as making, selling, using, incorporating, in-
stalling, or providing premises with asbestos or asbestos prod-
ucts. The causes of action in the complaint are stated generally
and jointly against all the defendants: "During the course of
[plaintiffs] employment, plaintiff was exposed to the defend-
ants' asbestos and asbestos containing materials to which ex-
Specious Claims and Global Settlements
As a practical matter, consolidation, liberal pleading, and
limited discoveryl 6 have had a substantial impact on pre-trial dis-
positive motions. It is simply not possible to establish that no rea-
sonable jury could find for a specific plaintiff when the founda-
tions of her claim are so vague and sweeping that they could be
fairly read to assert any number of potential allegations." Thus,
even if the ability to survive summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss might serve as a reasonable baseline for settlement purpos-
es in theory, the number of claims that could do so under this
framework could be far greater than expected in traditional tort
litigation.
Faced with the administrative burden of managing this liti-
gation, some courts became adept at encouraging the parties to
settle. In Madison County, Illinois, for example, defendants fre-
posure directly and proximately caused him to develop an as-
bestos related disease."
Arseneault v. Congoleum Corp., No. 01 Civ. 10657 (LMM), 2002 WL 472256,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (alterations in original). This approach to plead-
ing has been acknowledged in other forms of aggregate litigation as well. See
Canadian Nat'l/Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Smith, 926 So. 2d 839, 840-41 (Miss.
2006) (discussing FELA case asserting exposure to wide range of toxic sub-
stances); 3M Co. v. Glass, 917 So. 2d 90, 91 (Miss. 2005) (discussing similar
issue in state court silica litigation).
16. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex.
1990) (consolidating over two thousand claims in class action asbestos litiga-
tion), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); Brent M.
Rosenthal, Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 55 SMU L. REV. 1375, 1385-86 (2002)
(discussing disputes over individual claim discovery in Texas courts); Schwartz
& Tedesco, supra note 11, at 536 (discussing the expediting of asbestos mass
tort claims by way of consolidation and shortened discovery procedures).
17. After more than a decade of implicit endorsement of these practices
in Mississippi, for example, the state supreme court observed that the plaintiffs
"don't appear to know when they were exposed, where they were exposed, by
whom they were exposed, or even if they were exposed." Harold's Auto Parts,
Inc. v. Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493, 495 (Miss. 2004) (characterizing pleading
practices in the state as "a perversion of the judicial system unknown prior to the
filing of mass-tort cases"). Prior to Mangialardi, these vagaries effectively in-
creased the costs of litigation for defendants and likewise made it difficult, if not
impossible, to effectively distinguish cases on their respective merits.
18. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996)
(referring to forced settlement approaches as "judicial blackmail"); JOHN H.
BEISNER & JESSICA D. MILLER, LITIGATE THE TORTS, NOT THE MASS: A
MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING How MASS TORTS ARE ADJUDICATED 7
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quently complained that the asbestos court implemented "a system
that made a fair trial almost impossible" by, among other things:
rejecting requests for more definitive statements or discovery de-
fendants needed to prepare for trial effectively, limiting the defense
case for trivial discovery oversights, and forcing defendants to pre-
pare for multiple trials on the same day while allowing the plaintiff
to choose which one would proceed when that day arrived.19 Less
extreme but comparable examples of settlement pressure have been
noted in other states. 20 Regardless of the degree to which defend-
ants' characterizations fairly capture the reality of the procedures
employed, they reflect a common perception that the deck was
stacked against non-settling defendants.
Within these jurisdictions, claims that survived early dis-
positive motions were most often settled, either individually or as
(2009) (discussing judicial approaches designed to force settlement in mass tort
cases); Brickman, Silica MDL, supra note 11, at 308 ("These aggregations effec-
tively forced defendants to adopt mass settlement strategies even though many
of the claimants had suffered no actual asbestos-related injury or could not show
that any asbestos related disease was substantially caused by exposure to a de-
fendant's products."); Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudu-
lent Victims, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 575, 587 (2008) ("In addition to simply boosting
the total damage award, the addition of a fraudulent claim also enhances the
likelihood of settlement. If the defendant faces the risk of an enormous judg-
ment representing the claims of thousands of plaintiffs, it will feel great pressure
to settle in order to avoid a bankrupting damages judgment. Including fraudu-
lent claims therefore not only enhances the aggregate award, it enhances the
probability of a settlement." (footnote omitted)); Schwartz & Tedesco, supra
note 11, at 544 (arguing that mass consolidation "does not promote efficiency; it
merely forces defendants to settle").
19. See Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 554-55 (2007) (summarizing criticisms of the
Madison County, Illinois, asbestos case management).
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in
Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54
BAYLOR L. REv. 331, 350-51 (2002) (noting "draconian" pressure placed on
defendants in a Mississippi case and consolidation issues in West Virginia);
Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 19, at 549-52, 574 n.193 (discussing Mississippi
and Michigan). Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Innovations
and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (2006) (discussing forum shop-
ping and favorable venues for asbestos plaintiffs in various states).
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part of inventory settlements.21 In inventory settlements, firms
generally conditioned the settlement of their strongest claims on
the concurrent settlement of some or all of the other claims they
represented.22 Even claims that had not yet been subjected to dis-
covery or, for that matter, placed on an active trial docket, could be
settled and paid.23 Although some of these inventory settlements
may have conditioned payment on the production of nominal sup-
porting evidence 24-usually no more than sufficient to survive
summary judgment-this was not always the case.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that both plain-
tiffs and defendants preferred private administration schemes for
settling asbestos claims. For several years, most asbestos claims
were filed in "plaintiff friendly" jurisdictionS25 where mass settle-
ment was a given, 26 and administrative approaches allowed both
sides to avoid some of the expense of litigation. Thus, some de-
fendants agreed to forward-looking inventory settlement arrange-
ments with specific firms,27 while others adopted larger compre-
hensive settlement administration plans involving multiple firms2 8
21. Inventory settlements generate obvious agency problems, but these
issues are beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of these issues, see
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Au-
tonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519,
569-75 (2003).
22. See NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing grouping of weak
claims with strong claims in block settlements).
23. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Byrd, 44 So. 3d 943, 947-49 (Miss.
2010) (discussing inventory settlement plan).
24. See id. at 944-45 (noting low conditions for settlement documenta-
tion in agreement between firm and defendant).
25. For a discussion of the impact of forum shopping in asbestos litiga-
tion, see White, supra note 20, at 365 (acknowledging plaintiffs' ability to fo-
rum shop in asbestos litigation and discussing the impact on trial outcomes be-
tween 1987 and 2003).
26. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33
HOFSTRA L. REv. 833, 840 (2005) (noting that asbestos claims had little or no
risk of going unpaid and thus arguing that the contingency fees lawyers were
charging were "unreasonable").
27. See id. (arguing inventory settlements with going forward provisions
effectively removed risk of non-recovery).
28. A notable example is the Owens Coming National Settlement Pro-
gram ("NSP"). See NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 108-13 (discussing the opera-
tion of the NSP).
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and other defendants. 29 These settlements typically provided fixed
grids and criteria similar to that used by the Manville Personal In-
jury Settlement Trust.30 As a result, using a claim's prospects for
surviving summary judgment as the nominal standard for compen-
sation was transformed from a common practice into a fixed set-
tlement target.
The problem with these private arrangements, however,
was that they failed to provide lasting peace and, in fact, tended to
encourage firms to recruit more claims and submit them for pay-
ment.3 1 In short, it became apparent that any settlement that failed
to resolve existing and future claims could generate more new
claims than it resolved.32
In the mid-1990s, the leading candidate for resolving all
current and future mass tort claims appeared to be a class action
suit under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 33 Un-
der the proposed comprehensive class action settlements in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor34 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.,35 the settlement proponents settled inventory claims and
29. Two notable examples of multi-plaintiff and multi-defendant ar-
rangements are the Wellington Agreement and the settlement system adminis-
tered by the Center for Claims Resolution. See Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing
the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 481 &
n.116 (2001).
30. The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust was established under
Johns-Manville Corporation's Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization to process and
pay qualifying asbestos claims against the company. Frank J. Macchiarola, The
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO
L. REv. 583, 583 (1996). The trust currently divides compensable injuries into
eight categories-mesothelioma, two categories of lung cancer, "other" cancer,
three categories of asbestosis (ranked according to severity) and "other" asbestos
disease-and assigns a base settlement value to each category. See CLAIMS
RESOLUTION MGMT. CORP., 2002 TRUST DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 1,
http://www.claimsres.com/documents/MT/TDPO2.pdf. Claimants must also
provide basic information concerning their work histories and exposure to quali-
fy for settlement. Id. at 13.
31. See Marcus, supra note 29, at 481-82.
32. NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 111.
33. See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Ac-
tions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 595, 606 (1997) (noting that class actions
were the "preferred procedural device" at the time).
34. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
35. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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attempted to limit future asbestos claimants' recoveries to a pro-
posed distribution procedure that paid claims according to fixed
categories upon the submission of sufficient evidence to satisfy the
applicable criteria.36 This approach promised the efficiency of the
administrative model of private settlement plans and was intended
to afford defendants lasting peace from future claims. 37
After the Supreme Court effectively foreclosed class action
certification for asbestos claims in Amchem and Ortiz, thus doom-
ing the class action settlement approach,38 litigants pursued the
same basic settlement approach under Section 524(g) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.39 In this system, the lawyers who control the largest
asbestos claim inventories also control critical appointments in the
bankruptcy case,40 enjoy little resistance from most defendant-
debtors and others in designing the terms of the resulting trusts,41
and hold leadership positions in the trusts once they are estab-
lished.42 Not surprisingly, these terms and the manner in which the
trusts operate largely reflect the interests of the firms that establish
them.43 Thus, much like asbestos litigation and settlement practice
36. NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 78.
37. See id at 79.
38. See id. at 159-60 (noting that the "modern class action is an institu-
tion ill-suited for. . . a redistributive program").
39. See id at 21-22 (discussing use of bankruptcy to fashion mass tort
resolution across different mass torts); see also Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts
Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 128
(2004) ("[G]iven the failure of the Amchem and Ortiz class action settlements
and the failure of Congress to act on a general level, bankruptcy may well be the
only option available to defendants seeking peace in an intractable litigation.").
40. See generally S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise:
Voting Rights and the Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 841, 861-62 (discussing strategic and competitive dominance of the small
number of firms controlling the largest inventories in asbestos bankruptcies).
41. See id. at 860-62; see also William P. Shelley et al., The Need for
Transparency Between the Tort System and Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 17
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 257, 261 (2008) ("The dynamics of the bank-
ruptcy process tend to lead to trust agreements ... that are largely written by
counsel for the asbestos claimants themselves.").
42. See Brown, supra note 40, at 862-63.
43. See id. at 893-94 (outlining issues with the oversight of asbestos
bankruptcy plans and settlement administration); see also Yair Listokin & Ken-
neth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1435, 1481 (2004) (discussing obstacles to ensuring fairness in mass tort
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in state court, compensation from asbestos bankruptcy trusts is
available at a standard that provides a rough approximation of
whether the claims could survive summary judgment.4 4 The result
has been a system that neither resembles the traditional adversary
process nor compensates for the policing functions of adversary
litigation that have been stripped away.45
2. Claim Recruiting and Development
To meet the demand for rising asbestos claims, enterprising
lawyers drew inspiration from medical screening and monitoring
programs.46 Historically, these programs were used to evaluate at-
risk populations for signs of disease, with the goal of identifying
and treating these diseases early.4 7 These firms often enlisted un-
bankruptcies); Linda S. Mullenix, Commentary, Back to the Futures: Privatizing
Future Claims Resolution, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1919, 1926 (2000) (noting limits
of information provided to courts approving mass tort settlements).
44. See Charles E. Bates et al., The Naming Game, MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: ASBESTOS, Sept. 2, 2009, at 1, 7, available at http://www.bateswhite.com/
media/pnc/9/media.229.pdf (noting the higher propensity to file claims against
trusts because, among other reasons, their standards "are typically less strict than
the burden of proof in the Tort System"); see generally Shelley et al., supra note
41.
45. See NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 150 ("The problem of overclaiming
inheres in any move from a tort system predicated on individualized proof to-
ward a streamlined administrative regime. Efficient application of a compensa-
tion grid necessarily involves cutting corners by comparison to the detailed
proof that might be demanded in tort litigation."); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisit-
ing the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large
Scale Litigation, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 188 (2001) ("[T]housands
of lesser-value claims may be resolved en masse according to negotiated sched-
ules of damages that pay little attention to individual claim differences and in-
volve little adversarial litigation.").
46. See Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass
Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REv. 1221, 1226-27 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Brickman, Litigation Screenings] (discussing the creation of asbestos litiga-
tion screening practices).
47. See Brickman, Disconnect, supra note 11, at 63; David Maron &
Walker W. (Bill) Jones, Taming an Elephant: A Closer Look at Mass Tort
Screening and the Impact of Mississippi Tort Reforms, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 253,
264 (2006). For example, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
a variety of screening programs were established to test and track the physical
and mental injuries suffered by first responders and other high-risk populations.
2012 Specious Claims and Global Settlements 573
ions and other organizations to nominally sponsor screenings of
current and former workers in high-risk industries,48 and they
could easily present these screenings as a public service. 4 9 Moreo-
ver, the lawyers' presence could be seen as complementing this
service; ensuring that victims would obtain the medical benefits of
the screening, while providing ready access to lawyers who could
help them preserve and pursue their legal rights.so
See generally John Howard, The World Trade Center Disaster: Health Effects
and Compensation Mechanisms, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 69 (2007).
48. See Brickman, Disconnect, supra note 11, at 76 (noting the role of
unions in mass screenings); Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and
the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 733, 741 (1997) ("Un-
ions, churches, homeowners and renters associations, and other voluntary mem-
bership groups are also potential sources of clients.").
49. The late Fred Baron's remarks at the National Press Club in 2002
provide a vivid example of how this "public service" argument has been used to
deflect criticism of litigation screenings:
Myth 1: Plaintiffs' lawyers notoriously go out with x-ray
vans, find people who work in factories, and develop large
numbers of clients. Quite honestly, I am offended when
somebody criticizes me for providing free medical services to
a person who is working in a factory and who has been ex-
posed to asbestos. . . . Hundreds and hundreds of people who
have developed cancer have first learned that they had cancer,
hopefully early enough to save their life, as a result of x-ray
screenings that were provided either by their union or by
plaintiffs counsel. I am offended when people tell me that,
"it's terrible that you are giving free medical treatment to
working people who end up filing suits." I do not buy that ar-
gument. When a victim is diagnosed with a disease and
somebody is legally responsible under state law, there should
be no barrier to that individual filing a suit to reclaim their
rights.
Fred Baron, Address at the Nat'l Press Club (June 18, 2002), in Civ. JUST. F.,
Apr. 2003, at 11, 12, available at http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/
heartland migration/files/pdfs/12337.pdf; see also Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer
Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 175,
182-83 (2003) ("Even though the medical benefits of screening are dubious and
the quality of the testing provided is subject to question . . ., Baron's argument
has a large popular appeal. A grievance body that examines and possibly pun-
ished the recruitment methods would be subject to much public criticism and
hostility."(footnote omitted)).
50. See Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, Judicial Innovation in
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 127, 140 n.74 (1997) (noting
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Over time, litigation screenings elevated claim-
manufacturing efficiency over medical accuracy. Untrained em-
ployees assumed responsibility for taking medical histories,5'
which were often incomplete and inaccurate. 52  Similarly, some
screening companies intentionally performed tests incorrectly to
increase the likelihood of generating signs of impairment.53 Many
screening doctors did not see their work in this area as "medical
work"; 54 they assumed their role was not to provide medical care,
but to assist the lawyers in developing a colorable case for each
prospective plaintiff.
As a result, firms that used litigation screening companies
could generate claim volumes that far exceeded those achievable
through traditional medical screenings. In a 2004 study, for exam-
that while screenings may be perceived as a public service, they serve as a
"double-edged sword" for plaintiffs' attorneys who must make prompt filings
upon discovery of signs of exposure to avoid tolling of statutes of limitation).
51. See Brickman, Disconnect, supra note 11, at 67 ("[W]hile the record-
ing of patient information such as medications, age, race, medical history, and
exposure history are crucial to prevent errors in interpretation, the persons hired
by screening enterprises to gather that information typically lack any qualifica-
tions for the taking of exposure and medical histories and usually receive no
training."(footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See id. at 80 (discussing manipulation of medical histories).
53. See id. at 67-68 ("[S]creening enterprises administer pulmonary func-
tion tests in a manner that generates far higher numbers of lung-impaired per-
sons than would be the case if the standards established by the American Tho-
racic Society were observed."); id. at 90 ("[B]oth the X-ray equipment used and
the process of administering the X-rays leave much to be desired. However, the
resultant poor quality of X-rays may actually improve B-readers' ability, if not
propensity, to misread the X-ray." (footnote omitted)).
54. See ABA COMM'N. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES RECOMMENDATION 8 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/
archive/pdfs/NIOSH-0 15/020103-Exhibit 1 2.pdf ("The x-rays are generally read
by doctors who are not on site and who may not even be licensed to practice
medicine in the state where the x-rays are taken or have malpractice insurance
for these activities. According to these doctors, no doctor/patient relationship is
formed with the screened workers and no medical diagnoses are provided. Ra-
ther, the doctor purports only to be acting as a litigation consultant and only to
be looking for x-ray evidence that is 'consistent with' asbestos-related dis-
ease."). At least one doctor has successfully defended a medical malpractice
complaint based on his screening activities by insisting that he was not involved
in a doctor-patient relationship with those he screened. Adams v. Harron, No.
97-2547, 1999 WL 710326, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999) (per curiam).
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ple, researchers found that an objective medical screening identi-
fied potential asbestos injuries in only 4.5% of the x-rays exam-
ined, while litigation screenings had produced ostensible diagnoses
of asbestos personal injuries in an astounding 95.9% of cases from
the same x-ray pool.5 5  This recruiting system was remarkably
skilled at maximizing the size of the lawyers' respective invento-
ries because the enterprise could focus on building a mass of
claims that satisfied a low nominal compensation standard with
little care for whether or not those claims represented actual inju-
ries recognized under applicable tort law.56
3. The Impact of Specious Claims on Asbestos Settlements and
Recoveries
A telling point of general reference for the impact of asbes-
tos claim inflation generally is the Manville Personal Injury Set-
tlement Trust. Prior to its bankruptcy in 1982, the Johns-Manville
Corporation ("Manville") was the lead defendant in thousands of
suits across the country because numerous asbestos personal injury
victims could be linked to Manville products. 57 For much the same
reason, a substantial number of asbestos claimants have since pur-
sued claims against the Manville Trust.58
Overwhelming claim volumes, including tens of thousands
of claims that were generated through dubious litigation screen-
ings, have dramatically curtailed payments from the Manville
Trust to claimants for most of its existence. Although Manville's
55. See Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of "B" Readers' Interpreta-
tions of Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes, 11 ACAD.
RADIOLOGY 843, 855 (2004).
56. One plaintiffs' lawyer acknowledged this fact, explaining, "[T]he sole
purpose for ... asbestos screening programs is in anticipation of future litigation
against. [sic] asbestos manufacturers" and the process is "geared toward collect-
ing evidence for future asbestos litigation." Brief of Appellants at 19, In re
As[b]estos Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 98-1166, 98-1165, 1998 WL 34085715 (3d
Cir. 1998).
57. See Brown, supra note 40, at 846-47.
58. Recent Developments in Assessing Future Asbestos Claims Under the
FAIR Act: Hearing on S. 852 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
190-92 (2005) [hereinafter Lederer Testimony] (testimony of Mark E. Lederer,
Chief Financial Officer, Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust),
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/25947.pdf.
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Disclosure Statement for its Chapter 11 Plan estimated that the
trust would receive between 83,000 and 100,000 claims throughout
its lifetime, 100,000 claims were filed within the first year alone. 59
In fact, more than 190,000 claimants were seeking compensation
from the fund by January 1992.60 The trust ultimately obtained
authority to revise its payment scheme, the heart of which was the
dramatic reduction of payments to new claimants.6' Still, by 2005,
the trust had received over 690,000 claims-excluding withdrawn
claims-and was paying 5% of the scheduled value to settling
claimholders. 62
The Manville example unfortunately reflects the common
reality across asbestos bankruptcy trusts. 63 In a 2010 study, the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice reported that 86% of the claims
paid by asbestos trusts in 2007 and 2008 were nonmalignant
claims,' 4 which have largely been discredited elsewhere and sub-
jected to considerable legislative and judicial restrictions.65 Given
the volume of claims, "[m]ost trusts do not have sufficient funds to
pay every claim in full and, thus, [administrators] set a payment
percentage that is used to determine the actual payment a claimant
will be offered." 66 Specifically, the median payment percentage of
the trusts studied was 25% and fell as low as 1.1%.67
59. Id. at 198.
60. See MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST: HISTORY,
http://www.mantrust.org/history.htm (last visited May 5, 2012).
61. See id.
62. See Lederer Testimony, supra note 58, at 193.
63. See Mauger v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., No. 2154, No. 1631, 2007
Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 193, at *25 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. June 25, 2007) (dis-
cussing other trusts that have received several hundred thousand claims).
64. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., ASBESTOS
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY
WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE LARGEST TRUSTS xiv (2010) [hereinafter
RAND 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
technical reports/201 0/RANDTR872.pdf. The nonmalignant designation,
however, may be over-inclusive given the limits of the data available to RAND.
Id. at xiii-xiv.
65. See Mark A. Behrens, Asbestos Litigation Screening Challenges: An
Update, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 721, 755 (2009). See infra Part IV.A for a
more detailed discussion.
66. RAND 2010 REPORT, supra note 64, at xv.
67. Id.
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Notwithstanding this persistent pattern, courts continue to
confirm asbestos bankruptcy plans that encourage oversubscrip-
tion. In 2009, for example, Judge Gerber of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved
the 524(g) plan in the T H Agriculture & Nutrition ("T.H.A.N.")
bankruptcy case based, in part, on representations that all current
and future asbestos claimants would be paid in full. 68 Although
only 14,024 claims were pending prior to the bankruptcy 69 and a
mere 12,486 were qualified under the claim review process as of
the effective date, 93,331 claimbolders were allowed to vote on the
plan.70  By the time the T.H.A.N. trust began accepting post-
petition claim filings in April 2011, the trust had already paid out
nearly $400 million to claimants and raised its projected total lia-
bility from $900 million to roughly $2.5 billion, requiring the trust
to reduce its payment percentage to 30% going forward.7 1
The transformation of T.H.A.N. from a peripheral defend-
ant, to targeted defendant, and, ultimately, to the source of yet an-
68. In re T H Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C., No. 08-14692 (REG), 2009 WL
7193573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2009); see also Declaration of Francine F.
Rabinovitz in Support of Confirmation of the First Amended Prepackaged Plan
of Reorganization of T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code at 35, In re T H Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C., No. 08-
14692 (REG), 2009 WL 6679826 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2009) ("[T]he an-
ticipated Asbestos PI Trust funding will allow the Asbestos PI Trust to pay
100% of the value of each Asbestos PI Claim for the life of the Asbestos PI
Trust."); Kirk T. Hartley et al., Commentary, Pre-packaged Plan of Inequity:
The Financial Abuse of Future Claimants in the T H Agriculture & Nutrition
524(g) Asbestos Bankruptcy, MEALEY's ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., Nov. 2011, at
1, 3-4, available at http://www.bateswhite.com/media/pnc/2/media.492.pdf.
69. Disclosure Statement with Respect to a Prepackaged Plan of Reor-
ganization of T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code at 4, In re T H Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C., No. 1:08BK14692,
2008 WL 7947215 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter THAN Disclo-
sure Statement].
70. Declaration of James Sean McGuire Certifying Tabulation of Ballots
Regarding Vote on Debtor's Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization at 6, In re T H
Agric. & Nutrition, LLC, No. 08-14692 (REG), 2009 WL 7193573 (Bank.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008).
71. Notice Regarding Commencement of Claim Filing on April 1, 2011,
THAN Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (Mar. 14, 2011), http://
www.thanasbestostrust.com/Files/20110321 THAN CommencementNotice.P
DF.
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other asbestos trust plagued by oversubscription, is remarkable.
During its first three decades as a peripheral asbestos defendant,
T.H.A.N. paid approximately $2 million total to asbestos plaintiffs
in the tort system.72 Less than five years after it became a targeted
defendant in 2003, T.H.A.N. was in bankruptcy. Moreover, a mere
eight years after its defendant profile changed, T.H.A.N.'s aggre-
gate liability had grown more than 1250-fold in connection with its
global settlement. 73
Of course, oversubscription has had substantial conse-
quences for otherwise viable companies and plaintiffs with intrin-
sically strong claims alike. In asbestos, specious claims have his-
torically overwhelmed courtS74 and diverted compensation from
strong claims to weak claims and the lawyers that bring them.7 5
And though many defendants would have faced substantial liability
for intrinsically strong asbestos claims alone, this surge of specious
72. THAN Disclosure Statement, supra note 69, at 4.
73. Id. at 4-5.
74. Brown, supra note 40, at 890-91 (discussing how specious claim
filings overwhelm efficiencies in asbestos bankruptcies); see also Frederick T.
Smith, Commentary, Class Actions' Uncertain Future: Lessons from Ortiz v.
Fibreboard, reprinted in ANDREWS Toxic CHEMICALS LITIG. REP., Nov. 15,
1999, at 1, 10-11 ("In some parts of the country, mass tort claims have threat-
ened to overwhelm the civil justice system, accounting for more than one-
quarter of the entire civil caseload in certain courts.").
75. See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 8-9 (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
107shrg88289/pdf/CHRG-107shrg88289.pdf (noting how unimpaired asbestos
claims diminish recoveries for the sick); Brickman, Litigation Screenings, supra
note 46, at 1228 (1 estimate that lawyers have spent at least $500 million, and
perhaps as much as $1 billion, to conduct litigation screenings that have gener-
ated over 1,000,000 claimants, most of whose claims are specious, and contin-
gency fees well in excess of thirteen billion dollars." (footnote omitted)); Mat-
thew Bergman & Jackson Schmidt, Editorial, Change Rules on Asbestos Law-
suits, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 30, 2002, at B7 (noting that "the
genuinely sick and dying are often deprived of adequate compensation as more
and more funds are diverted into settlements of the non-impaired claims");
Quenna Sook Kim, Asbestos Trust Says Assets Are Reduced as the Medically
Unimpaired File Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6 (noting that "a 'dis-
proportionate amount of Trust settlement dollars have gone to the least injured
claimants-many with no discernible asbestos-related physical impairment
whatsoever"').
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claims forced dozens into bankruptcy 76 and transformed asbestos
litigation into an "endless search for a solvent bystander."77
B. Silica Personal Injury: A Failed Specious Claim Market
While asbestos mass tort litigation has experienced multi-
ple peaks and valleys in its forty-year history, silica personal injury
filings did not reach epic proportions until the early 2000s."8 Giv-
en the ready comparisons between asbestosis and silicosis litiga-
tion, plaintiff-oriented litigation conferences and defense-side
journals alike touted silica litigation as the "next asbestos." 79 In-
deed, the Wall Street Journal reported that silica mass tort litiga-
tion appeared poised to rival asbestos litigation, both in terms of
size and character.8 0
76. See Charles Bates & Charlie Mullin, Commentary, The Bankruptcy
Wave of 2000-Companies Sunk By an Ocean of Recruited Asbestos Claims,
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Jan. 24, 2007, at 39, 39, available at
www.bateswhite.com/media/pnc/6/media.286.pdf ("Mass recruited claims
caused the bankruptcy wave of asbestos defendants that began in 2000 and even-
tually resulted in the bankruptcy of more than 40 companies."). The authors
conclude that "the cost to defendants, their insurers, and seriously injured asbes-
tos claimants from the mass recruiting of over 600,000 unimpaired asbestos
claimants may eventually total $50 billion." Id. at 44.
77. 'Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation'-A Discussion with
Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Mar.
1, 2002, at 1, 5, available at http://www.shb.com/attorneys/SchwartzVictor/
MedicalMonitoringandAsbestosLitigation_2002.pdf (recounting the experiences
of former asbestos plaintiffs' lawyer Dickie Scruggs).
78. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., THE
ABUSE OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC PRACTICES IN MASS LITIGATION: THE CASE OF
SILICA ix (2009) [hereinafter RAND SILICA REPORT], http://www.rand.org/pubs/
technicalreports/2009/RAND TR774.pdf.
79. See Martha Sharp, Silica: The Next Asbestos?, 3 ENFORCE: INS.
POL'Y ENFORCEMENT J., no. 3, 2004 at 5, 6, available at http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/34386057/The-Next-Asbestos (noting sharp rise in
silica litigation claims and suggesting that each claim would be worth "six fig-
ures"). Aside from the similarities in the resulting injuries-asbestosis and sili-
cosis are both incurable lung diseases with long latency periods-many Ameri-
cans have been exposed to silica dust at home and in the workplace. See id.; see
also RAND SILICA REPORT, supra note 78, at 37 (discussing wide range of in-
dustries with workplace exposure to silica dust).
80. Susan Warren, Silicosis Suits Rise Like Dust: Lawyers in Asbestos
Cases Target Many of the Same Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at B5.
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Notwithstanding its promising start, silica personal injury
litigation as a mass tort was "essentially over" by the end of
2005. In 2003, more than 10,000 of these claims were consoli-
dated in Multidistrict Litigation 1553 ("the Silica MDL"), which
was overseen by Judge Janis Jack in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.82 In 2005, following ex-
tensive discovery and a Daubert hearing, Judge Jack issued an
opinion83 that exposed numerous flaws in the litigation screening
practices-largely borrowed from asbestos litigation practice 84
that generated the vast majority of the underlying claims.
Although many of the courts overseeing asbestos litigation
routinely limited discovery into individual claims, Judge Jack ap-
proved increasingly aggressive inquiries into the screening practic-
es that generated the claims before her. As in other multidistrict
litigation, 8 5 the court required the submission of plaintiff fact
sheets that included relevant medical and diagnostic information,
including the identity of the doctor diagnosing the plaintiff with a
silica-related disease and copies of supporting documentation.86
Moreover, notwithstanding plaintiffs' efforts to quash subpoenas
directed to the diagnosing doctors due to their designation as con-
sulting experts, the defendants were able to depose Dr. George
Martindale.8 7 Following some troubling revelations at this deposi-
tion, the court "proposed Daubert hearings/Court depositions for
all of the remaining diagnosing doctors, as well as the screening
companies (such as N&M) that hired most of them."88
81. RAND SILICA REPORT, supra note 78, at ix.
82. Id. at 3-4.
83. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D. Tex.
2005).
84. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 577-78.
85. See discussion infra Part III.A.
86. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
87. Id. at 579-81. Although plaintiffs' counsel represented that Martin-
dale was a consulting expert in their motion to quash his deposition, "Dr. Mar-
tindale testified that he was not Plaintiffs' expert and had specifically refused
Plaintiffs' lawyers' requests to serve as their expert." Id. at 581. More signifi-
cantly, Dr. Martindale testified that he had not intended to diagnose anyone with
silicosis and withdrew the ostensible "diagnoses" bearing his signature for 3617
plaintiffs in the litigation. Id. at 581-84.
88. Id. at 584.
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The court's inquiry revealed a number of disturbing prac-
tices that mirrored those found in asbestos litigation. Among other
things, those who took medical histories and performed complicat-
ed pulmonary function tests had no medical training,89 doctors per-
formed rushed examinations-if any physical exams occurred at
all-and "simply ignored" differential diagnosis, 90 and screening
companies "shopped" individual x-rays to different doctors until
receiving a positive diagnosis. 91 One doctor even left pre-signed
ILO forms 92 with the screening company.9 3 Moreover, some law
firms only paid the screening companies for positive diagnoses, 94
giving the screening companies and the doctors they employed a
strong financial incentive to generate a high positive reading yield.
In sum, this inquiry revealed a practice that effectively en-
sured that the doctors and others involved could avoid accountabil-
ity. Specifically, screening companies divided responsibility for
several critical steps in the medical review process,9 5 so nobody
"assumed overall responsibility and oversight for the entire pro-
cess." 96 Indeed, most of the silica screening doctors justified their
involvement by marginalizing their own roles. They argued that
most of the work was done by others, 97 that they were misled into
believing they were merely verifying previous diagnoses, 98 that
they were not really diagnosing anyone with anything or otherwise
89. Id. at 598-99.
90. Id. at 600, 629.
91. See id. at 601.
92. An ILO form is frequently used to document findings of lung abnor-
malities and will often be sufficient medical documentation to establish such
findings in asbestos settlements.
93. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
94. See id. at 601.
95. Id. at 633 ("[I]n many cases, a different person performed each of the
following steps: taking the occupational history, performing the physical exam,
reading the x-ray, analyzing the pulmonary function tests, taking the medical
history, and finally, making a diagnosis. The people performing the steps were
so compartmentalized that often they did not know the others' identities, let
alone whether they were qualified and were performing their assigned tasks
correctly.").
96. Id.
97. Id. at 583-84, 605-06, 609-11, 617, 619, 639 n.121.
98. Id. at 582.
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practicing medicine, 99 and that the misleading language in the re-
ports they signed was merely legalese prepared by lawyers or
screening company officials. 00
As a result of these practices, the rate of positive diagnoses
was shockingly high. One of the screening companies, for exam-
ple, "found 400 times more silicosis cases than the Mayo Clinic
(which sees 250,000 patients a year) treated during the same peri-
od."101 Moreover, although a dual diagnosis of asbestosis and sili-
cosis is the medical equivalent of hitting a hole-in-one, the vast
majority of the plaintiffs advancing silicosis claims in the Silica
MDL had been involved in asbestos litigation and had submitted
nominal diagnoses of asbestosis in support of their claims for pay-
ment from asbestos settlements.102 On the stand, one of the doc-
tors who rendered conflicting diagnoses for the same plaintiff in
the Silica MDL and asbestos litigation said he "didn't know" if he
could explain the discrepancy between the two diagnoses and sub-
sequently asked for counsel, terminating his testimony.'o0 As
Judge Jack surmised:
[T]hese diagnoses were about litigation rather than
health care. And yet this statement, while true,
overestimates the motives of the people who engi-
neered them. The word "litigation" implies (or
should imply) the search for truth and the quest for
justice. But it is apparent that truth and justice had
very little to do with these diagnoses-otherwise
more effort would have been devoted to ensuring
they were accurate. Instead, these diagnoses were
driven by neither health nor justice: they were
manufactured for money.104
Following the opinion, few of the silica claims were pur-
sued in state court. In Texas, for example, of the approximately
5839 silica cases technically on the docket, only fifty-four plain-
99. See id. at 584, 603-04, 618-19, 634-35, 640.
100. Id. at 583, 604, 617.
101. Id. at 603.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 607.
104. Id. at 635.
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tiffs attempted to satisfy the medical reporting law passed in 2005,
and only twenty-two were active as of September 2010.0
C. The Fen-Phen Settlement Specious Claim Market
Fen-Phen was a wildly popular anti-obesity treatment in the
1990s. The FDA requested its withdrawal in September 1997, af-
ter reports suggested a connection between use of the treatment
and valvular heart disease and pulmonary hypertension, primarily
in women. 106  The subsequent flood of personal injury claims
against American Home Products, the distributor of the drugs sus-
pected in causing these injuries, ultimately led to the Nationwide
Class Action Settlement Agreement.107 At the time, this settlement
was considered an impressive achievement; it appeared to over-
come the legitimacy concerns that doomed Amchem and Ortiz,08
and its claim qualification criteria appeared to limit the potential
for over-claiming. This section highlights the conditions of the
settlement and how, notwithstanding its strict parameters, a clear
specious claim market arose and flooded the settlement with
claims.
1. The Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement
Much like asbestos trusts and other comprehensive settle-
ments, the Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement re-
quired claimants to submit medical evidence, including a Thysi-
cian's report, demonstrating a qualifying medical injury.10 The
105. HON. JOSEPH HALBACH, JR., CAUSE No. 2004-70000 STATEWIDE
SILICA MDL, 333D DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY,TEXAS, TEXAS CIVIL
PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE SECTION 90.010(k) REPORT (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/24/Section 90.010(k) Report.pdf.
106. David J. Morrow, Fen-Phen Maker to Pay Billions in Settlement of
Diet-Injury Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/08/business/fen-phen-maker-to-pay-billions-
in-settlement-of-diet-injury-cases.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
107. Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with American
Home Products Corp. (As Amended), MDL No. 1203, Civ. No. 99-20593 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 18, 1999), [hereinafter Diet Drugs 1999 Settlement],
http://www.settlementdietdrugs.com/pdfs/AmendedSettlement%20Agreement%
20.pdf.
108. NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 136-43.
109. See Diet Drugs 1999 Settlement, supra note 107, at § VI.C.
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assessment form submitted by board-certified cardiologists or car-
diothoracic surgeons to classify claims required use of a specified
formula in support of the doctor's determination that the claimed
valvular leakage was mild, moderate, or severe.110 In addition, the
form required information concerning the claimant's medical his-
tory.'
To verify the quality of the claim pool, the settlement
agreement established a detailed audit process. Unlike most asbes-
tos settlements and trusts, audits of 15% of the claims filed were
mandatory rather than discretionary or conditioned on the consent
of plaintiffs' counsel.'1 2 The settlement also provided for severe,
albeit discretionary, penalties in the event the court concluded that
there was no medical basis for an audited claim.1 3 These penalties
included audits of other claims involving the same attorneys or
physicians, payment of certain costs and fees, and potential referral
for criminal prosecution." 4
2. Oversubscription and Specious Claims
Although the fen-phen settlement was carefully structured
to screen out weak claims, it was not infallible. Given the structure
of the settlement, a claimant with a disqualifying history might
otherwise qualify if the doctor omitted that history from the Green
Form. Moreover, if the doctor exaggerated the measurements of a
claimant's valvular leakage, the claimant might qualify for a sub-
stantially higher payment classification under the matrix estab-
lished in the settlement than she was otherwise entitled. Thus,
110. See Appendix to GREEN FORM, Settlement Matrix Compensation
Benefits Guide for Physicians, Attorneys and Class Members (on file with au-
thor).
111. Id
112. See Diet Drugs 1999 Settlement, supra note 107, at § VI.E.1 (provid-
ing for audit of 15% of the claim pool). All other nominally qualifying claims
were to be paid without audit, but payments for the audited claims were with-
held pending the results of the audit. Id. at § VI.E.2; see Brown v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), MDL No. 1203, Civ. No. 99-
20593, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23595, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2002) ("As of
now, 85% of the claims must be paid without any real check on their legitima-
cy.").
113. Diet Drugs 1999 Settlement, supra note 107, at § VI.E.8.
114. Id
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plaintiffs could readily advance claims that appeared to satisfy the
settlement criteria where, in fact, their claims had little or no in-
trinsic merit.
Several plaintiffs' lawyers and screening service providers
recruited dozens of doctors to review large volumes of echocardio-
grams, many of which had actually been taken by technologists in
hotel rooms and other sites around the country. "5 As in the litiga-
tion screenings in the asbestos and silica litigations, fen-phen doc-
tors who generated large volumes of qualifying claims could earn
millions of dollars within a few months.1 6
The manner in which these "echocardiogram mills" operat-
ed generated objectively specious claims. Among other things,
some technologists systematically over-read and over-measured
the echocardiograms to show that the patients had positive read-
ings when they did not or qualified higher leakage requirements
than the tests actually reflected.' "7 Nonetheless, some of the doc-
tors either signed off on the technologists' readings without any
review or delegated their review obligations to other parties.
One doctor allegedly spent between sixteen seconds and no more
than seven minutes per diagnosis and intentionally manipulated the
equipment to capture misleading images to generate ostensible
diagnoses. 119 In at least one case, the U.S. Attorney's office al-
leged that the measurements reported on the form "were not con-
sistent with the measurements of hearts of human beings."l20
Notwithstanding the potential for audit, the settlement was
besieged with far more nominally qualifying claims than statisti-
115. See Brickman, Litigation Screenings, supra note 46, at 1259-60 (dis-
cussing recruiting and screening practices).
116. See Indictment at 11-12, United States v. Tai, No. 2: 10-cr-00769-JS
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Tai Indictment] (outlining more than $2
million in billings for mass produced diagnoses); Complaint at 10-11, AHP
Settlement Trust v. Crouse, No. 03-5252 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2003) [hereinafter
Crouse Complaint], http://www.settlementdietdrugs.com/pdfs/Complaint
Against LindaCrouse_091803.pdf (noting over $3.2 million earned in eleven
months).
117. See Tai Indictment, supra note 116, at 9.
118. See id.
119. See Crouse Complaint, supra note 116, at 10-11 (noting that one
doctor earned more than $3.2 million in eleven months from just two of the
roughly twenty-five law firms using her services).
120. Tai Indictment, supra note 116, at 10.
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cally possible, leading the court to order an audit of the entire
claim pool.12 1 Early audit reports revealed that roughly 12.5% of
the claims submitted were legitimate under the settlement criteria
and that "high percentages of unfounded medical diagnoses corre-
lated with particular physicians and particular plaintiffs' law
firms." 22 In sum, the overwhelming majority of the claims were
intrinsically weak but nominally qualifying due to manipulation of
the evidence. Although the Nationwide Class Action Settlement
was initially projected to largely resolve the fen-phen litigation at a
cost of $3.75 billion,123 American Home Products Corporation and
its successors 124 have paid roughly $21 billion to settle the suits to
date.125
III. SPECIOUS CLAIM OPPORTUNITIES, INCENTIVES, AND
JUSTIFICATIONS
Speciousness is in the eye of the beholder. A claim ad-
vanced by a plaintiff who was never exposed to a defendant's
product and lacks a verifiable injury is likely to be viewed as spe-
cious by most observers, while one with a lengthy history of expo-
sure and extensive medical documentation of a resulting injury will
be viewed as non-specious. Beyond these clear categories, howev-
er, whether a claim is specious or not tends to be murky. Are
claims specious if they are unlikely to succeed at trial, or are they
specious only if they are unlikely to get to a jury? Should we treat
claims as specious merely because they are of unknown veracity,
or should we accept the defendant's settlement in spite of this lack
121. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F. Supp. 2d 442, 476
(E.D. Pa. 2008) ("[N]umerous attorneys, some with nefarious intentions, operat-
ed echocardiogram mills to develop a vast inventory of claimants . . . . This
flood of claims was unexpected and out of step with the learned projections
based on epidemiologic and demographic evidence.").
122. NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 145.
123. Morrow, supra note 106.
124. American Home Products Corporation, subsequently known as Wy-
eth, was acquired by Pfizer Inc. on October 15, 2009. Wyeth Transaction,
PFIZER, http://www.pfizer.com/investors/shareholderservices/wyeth
transaction.jsp (last visited May 6, 2012).
125. Alex Berenson, Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
I1/10/business/1Omerck.html?pagewanted=all.
Vol. 42586
Specious Claims and Global Settlements
of knowledge as evidence that the claims are non-specious? In
global settlement, should we consider claims specious because,
contrary to the apparent assumptions of the settlement agreement,
the manner in which they are developed reduces the likelihood that
traditional plaintiff self-selection and attorney gate-keeping will
occur, or should we limit this term to those cases in which support-
ing information is actively manufactured to create a knowingly
deceptive perspective of claim merit?
If we accept that claim merit and value are fixed and
known, we can distinguish specious and non-specious claims sole-
ly on merit. For example, if we characterize claims as having one
of two fixed types, frivolous claims with zero value and non-
frivolous claims with a value of D, it is possible to outline a basic
framework for determining who should submit claims to a settle-
ment grid. Plaintiffs with frivolous claims know their type and that
they will face less scrutiny in a streamlined settlement, so they
should be expected to subscribe to the settlement. Likewise, those
holding non-frivolous claims should also submit claims for pay-
ment where they expect to receive compensation that exceeds D.
Conversely, non-frivolous types with expected damages in excess
of D should either seek to opt out (if possible) or find their claims
undervalued in a binding settlement. In either case, adverse selec-
tion has negative consequences for either high-value non-frivolous
claim holders-who are forced to accept a lower value than D in a
binding settlement-or for defendants-who lose the peace they
sought through settlement as increasing numbers of stronger claims
opt out. In sum, this basic adverse selection framework promises
to explain both why specious claims are filed and paid and how
their presence undermines the objectives of global settlement.
Such a simplified framework, however, omits the largest
pool of claims: those that are neither clearly frivolous nor clearly
meritorious. Even if claims are intrinsically fixed types, the evi-
dentiary support for claims in litigation and settlement tends to be
malleable and subject to competing interpretations. Thus, if merit
is based on satisfaction of the adopted standard, those who know-
ingly advance frivolous claims can do so because they are able to
manufacture sufficient evidentiary support to satisfy the estab-
lished criteria. If we limit "merit" under this standard to intrinsic
merit, this malleability can yield sufficient internal uncertainty so
that repeat players may submit frivolous claims they believe to be
non-frivolous or, at least, do not have sufficient reasons to view as
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objectively frivolous.126 In short, distinguishing specious and non-
specious claims solely on the basis of known information about
their merits is unlikely to capture the universe of claims we com-
monly view as specious.
Some claims are developed specifically in a manner that is
intended to manufacture the appearance of merit without regard for
whether the claims do, in fact, have merit. At least some of these
manufactured claims may have intrinsic merit, but we are unable to
distinguish them from manufactured claims that do not. In light of
the ability of plaintiffs and their counsel to control how they de-
velop claims and the degree to which development shortcuts re-
duce the capacity of streamlined settlement administration systems
to distinguish good and bad claims, this Part treats all such manu-
factured claims as specious regardless of their unknown intrinsic
merit. In these cases, the onus should be on the plaintiffs to devise
more reliable mechanisms for producing support that is reliable.
Similarly, even claim development practices that may pro-
duce reliable evidentiary support under most circumstances may
become unreliable when critical stages are outsourced to unreliable
parties. Although some courts have concluded that lawyers are
entitled to accept the work of medical and other legal professionals
at face value for ethical purposes, it may be just as difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish the good and bad claims that are gener-
ated as it is in the intentional claim manufacturing scenario. Here,
too, this Part treats these claims as specious not because it speaks
to their intrinsic merit but because the claims are ultimately pre-
sented as something they are not: premised upon reliable eviden-
tiary support. As a whole, then, this Part focuses not only on
claims that are specious inasmuch as the evidence known to the
126. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of
Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 138-39 (1993)
("[P]laintiffs are likely to systematically overestimate the value of their claims,
and defendants are likely to underestimate the value of claims brought against
them."); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1317,
1325 (2006) ("Even with the best of intentions, attorneys, like any decision
makers, are subject to cognitive biases, peer pressures, and information barriers
that compromise counseling responsibilities."); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer
Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Inter-
viewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 437, 543
(2008) (noting clients report facts as they cognitively perceive them).
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plaintiffs should preclude their submission, but also those claims
that are based on development practices that, by design or manipu-
lation by key participants, will generate evidence that frames bad
claims as good.
Although some may take issue with this approach in light
of the fact that it characterizes some innocent plaintiffs' intrinsical-
ly meritorious claims as specious, this is not a normative judgment
as much as it is an assessment of the range of practices that plague
global settlement. Given the critical role that repeat players have
in collective litigation and settlement,' 2 7 targeting their incentive
framework with respect to unreliable practices and outsourcing
should encourage self-selection and gate-keeping against advanc-
ing frivolous claims more effectively than merely targeting those
individuals advancing claims that they know to be frivolous.128
Indeed, the case studies demonstrate that the orthodox focus on the
latter is unlikely to succeed across cases. For example, although
early oversubscription in the fen-phen global settlement might be
explained by reference to the fact that compensation for unaudited
127. There is general agreement that plaintiffs' lawyers are the driving
force behind mass tort claim recruiting and filing patterns. See Brickman, Liti-
gation Screenings, supra note 46, at 1232-33 (criticizing the entrepreneurial
model of asbestos litigation and its role in expanding the volume of asbestos
claims); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass
Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REv. 747, 808 (2002) (noting the "driving
force" in selecting certain cases is entrepreneurship); Richard A. Nagareda, In
the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 319 (1996) (ana-
lyzing the role of entrepreneurial mass tort attorneys in mass tort filing patterns);
David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REv. 831, 848-49 (2002) (analyzing
claim investment considerations in mass tort); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Di-
lemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 480 (1994) ("The speed
with which the number of breast implant cases exploded on the scene is attribut-
able in part to a well-organized plaintiffs' bar, which now has the capital, organ-
izational skills, and advertising techniques to seek clientele.").
128. Cf McGovern, supra note 33, at 606 (noting the impact of timing on
potential returns and the manner in which it may influence client recruiting).
For example, even before the Silica MDL, asymptomatic asbestos client recruit-
ing dropped significantly due to the growth of deferred dockets, tort reform, and
restrictions on consolidation. See TOWERS WATSON, A SYNTHESIS OF ASBESTOS
DISCLOSURES FROM FORM 10-Ks: INSIGHTS 1 (2010), http://www.towerswatson.
com/assets/pdf/l492/AsbestosDisclosuresInsights 4-15-10.pdf.
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claims was paid before the audited claims were reviewed,129 thus
allowing repeat players to obtain large recoveries before their en-
tire claim pools might be subjected to audit, several objectively
specious claims were submitted after the court ordered audits of
every claim submitted, 3 0  criminal investigations were an-
nounced,131 and civil suits against some of those involved were
initiated.13 2
In addition, although the basic adverse selection framework
may reflect the risk-reward assessment when there is one decision
maker controlling the process from beginning to end, mass tort
claims are mostly recruited and developed by discrete sub-groups,
with individuals playing specific roles and performing routine, yet
critical tasks in a larger group effort. This division of functions
across sub-groups and individuals further limits the knowledge
attributable to any one participant, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood that participants will perceive objectively specious claims as
sufficiently colorable to warrant submission in settlement.' 33
Moreover, organizational dynamic research suggests that group
socialization and institutional memory encourages the escalation
and justification of dubious practices even where participants are
otherwise ethical and upstanding citizens.' 34
In sum, the origins for oversubscription are more complex
and nuanced than those reflected in the basic adverse selection
129. NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 241-42.
130. See, e.g., Tai Indictment, supra note 116, at 7-12 (detailing criminal
action against doctor involved in fen-phen specious claims diagnoses after full
audits were ordered).
131. See, e.g., Jeremy Hudson, Woman Sentenced in Fen-Phen Scam, THE
CLARION-LEDGER, Dec. 22, 2004, at IB (recounting how a sixty-three year-old
woman was sentenced to ten months in prison for taking $250,000 in a fake
settlement); Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello, The $22 Billion Gold Rush,
FORBES (Apr. 10, 2006), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0410/086.htnl
(questioning how much of $22 billion in settlement payments went to individu-
als with specious claims).
132. See Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Tough Questions Are Raised
on Fen-Phen Compensation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at Cl (discussing RICO
case against fen-phen echo-mill doctor).
133. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 3, at 12 ("[S]pecialization not only
fosters a diffusion of responsibility, it makes it difficult for any individual to
comprehend (and easy to deny) the 'big picture."').
134. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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model. To account for these considerations, this Part incorporates
claim uncertainty and organizational dynamics into a broader
framework for analyzing and predicting oversubscription potential
in global settlement. Specifically, this Part outlines how collective
settlement alters claim recruiting and development opportunities,
generates distinct incentives to pursue these opportunities, and re-
inforces common justifications for advancing specious claims.
A. Development Opportunities in Collective Settlement
Although most tort cases settle, these settlements tend to be
framed by the parties' respective expected outcomes if a given case
went to trial.135 Predicting trial outcomes is far from a perfect sci-
ence. For example, assume a case in which the plaintiff has strong
objective evidence of exposure to a defective product and injury,
but her evidence supporting a causal connection between the two
hinges upon the credibility of a medical expert. One jury might
not find the expert credible, while another might find the testimony
compelling. A third jury could also discount the quality of the ex-
posure evidence or injury even if the defense raised only a perfunc-
tory challenge to it. This uncertainty carries the potential for un-
der- or over-compensation at trial, with both sides adopting rough
acceptable settlement ranges given their respective understandings
of the risks given the available evidence and applicable law.
Collective settlements can reduce this uncertainty dramati-
cally by supplanting tort law with a negotiated grid for compensa-
tion. In these cases, objective exposure and injury criteria replace
the costly individualized assessment of exposure to a dangerous
product or an accident plus injury, and the causal connection be-
tween the two, in a typical tort claim. Thus, claims that might have
substantially different values in tort litigation may nonetheless be
pooled in the same injury or exposure categories for the purposes
of settlement. The manner in which this pooling is framed can, in
turn, alter recruiting and development opportunities for plaintiffs'
firms.
135. See, e.g., LLOYD DIXON & GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, ASBESTOS
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS AND TORT COMPENSATION 8-9 (2011), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RANDMGI 104
.pdf.
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1. Predictability and Fixed Targets
In each of the markets reviewed, plaintiffs expected that
their claims were compensable upon satisfaction of a predictable
lower evidentiary standard than typically required at trial. This
predictability is apparent in two distinct ways. First, the recurring
pattern of obtaining "inventory" or "block" asbestos settlements
for claims that survived early dispositive motions effectively re-
duced the nominal standard for asbestos claims to whether they
had sufficient support to survive a motion to dismiss.'36 Again,
plaintiffs could recruit and target claim development toward a
fixed standard, but predictability may have been the product of
substantial changes in substantive law and procedure, high defend-
ant elasticity, and the presence of repeat players on both sides,137
rather than any specific fixed settlement plan. As the judge over-
seeing asbestos litigation in New York City from 1987 to 2008
noted, this elasticity meant that the risk of non-recovery "all but
disappeared" by the early 1990s.138
Second, each of the comprehensive settlements qualified
claims for payment upon satisfaction of clear, "check-the-box"
136. As a group of prominent plaintiffs' firms argued in the W.R. Grace
bankruptcy, the only relevant question was whether the claimant could produce
some form of evidence in support of her claim, not whether the evidence was
questionable. Response to and Opposition to Debtor's Motion to Compel As-
bestos Personal Injury Claimants Represented by Edward 0. Moody, P.A., Fos-
ter & Sear L.L.P., Motley Rice LLC, and Williams Bailey Law Firm, LLP to
Respond to the W.R. Grace Asbestos Personal Injury Questionnaire and Motley
Rice LLC's Joinder in the Responses of Various Law Firms Representing As-
bestos Personal Injury Claimants in Opposition to Debtor's Motion Compel, In
re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-01139355 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). Similarly, the
court in the Armstrong bankruptcy rejected an estimation analysis that assumed
plaintiffs in the tort system must identify a debtor's product to be compensated
because it was not "the reality in asbestos litigation," where limits on product
identification records would "preclude summary judgment on this issue." In re
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 130 (D. Del. 2006).
137. Repeat players in litigation tend to adopt recognized settlement pat-
terns. Moreover, RAND reports that some defense attorneys actively encour-
aged plaintiffs to file additional suits against their clients, apparently as a means
of generating fees during the inevitable march toward settlement. RAND SILICA
REPORT, supra note 78, at xiv.
138. See Hon. Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos
Litigation, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 511, 525 (2008).
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criteria that were far more predictable and less difficult to satisfy
than might be expected in tort.139 Unlike traditional one-to-one
case settlements, which tend to be agreed upon after the defendant
has evaluated the specific facts of the claim, comprehensive set-
tlements provided ample opportunity for firms to recruit new cli-
ents and develop their claims to the fixed nominal standard. In
asbestos bankruptcies, where a select group of plaintiffs' firms
largely dictate the terms of any trust distribution procedures 40 and
claim processors must rely upon repeat business from these same
firms,14 1 evidentiary targets will vary little and tend to be far easier
to satisfy than in the tort system and less likely to change unex-
pectedly than private inventory settlements.
Finally, although the plaintiffs in the Silica MDL could not
rely on a similar track record in state silica personal injury litiga-
tion, many at the time saw the litigation as following the same
track-including a substantial potential for high defendant elastici-
ty 142 -and the litigation may have succeeded but for a "fortuitous
combination of factors" that brought the unreliability of these
screening practices front and center in the MDL.'43
2. Targeted Development and Claim Manufacturing
The ability to focus recruiting and development to a specif-
ic evidentiary target expands the claim pool to those that would
139. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
140. See generally Brown, supra note 40 (discussing strategic and compet-
itive dominance of the small number of firms controlling the largest inventories
in asbestos bankruptcies).
141. See id. at 843.
142. In fact, the plaintiffs in that case adopted an aggressive, high-dollar
settlement approach premised on the assumption that the defendants would fol-
low the asbestos litigation settlement model. See Roger Parloff, Diagnosing for
Dollars, FORTUNE (June 13, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune archive/2005/06/13/8262537/index.htm ("In April 2004 the plaintiffs'
lead counsel presented the defendants with a letter demanding $1 billion to settle
the cases. He suggested that the price was a bargain, because 'litigating the
Silica MDL will collectively cost the defendants more than $1,500,000,000' in
pretrial expenses alone.").
143. RAND SILICA REPORT, supra note 78, at 27.
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stand little chance of success at trial.'" For example, where a
work history is sufficient evidence of a causal link under the crite-
ria, the absence of credible evidence that the plaintiff was exposed
long enough to cause the alleged injury under applicable tort law is
no longer relevant to the recruiting decision. Likewise, although
the persuasive value of the evidence supporting a specific client's
heart valve or lung abnormalities may be limited at trial, that con-
cern should not deter firms from accepting the case when it can be
submitted for payment under a fixed standard that accepts the evi-
dence as sufficient.
Beyond evidentiary gaps, targeted development generates
opportunities for dubious evidentiary development practices. For
example, a firm may have reservations about advancing a claim for
which plaintiff-friendly doctors repeatedly fail to find evidence of
physiological changes sufficient to warrant compensation in litiga-
tion, but it may continue shopping those x-rays to other doctors
until they find one who is willing to make that representation when
it only takes one such report to obtain compensation from an exist-
ing settlement. 14 5 At the extreme, fixed targets suggest an oppor-
tunity to manufacture claims by creating evidence that bears little
resemblance to reality.
Conceptually, the targeted development pattern will sound
familiar to students of the collapse of the subprime mortgage mar-
ket and the subsequent economic crisis. Once demand exceeded
the available supply of high-grade mortgages, brokers and finan-
cial institutions identified gaps in credit rating assumptions that
allowed them to obtain, package, and sell high-risk loans as low-
144. Although some may find this expansion beyond colorable litigation
claims problematic standing alone, this normative view is not without controver-
sy. The focus of this Article is not, however, to determine the appropriate evi-
dentiary standard for collective settlement but to identify the manner in which
the standard selected may be distorted beyond one or more of the settlement
proponents' expectations.
145. See David Egilman, Letter to the Editor, Asbestos Screenings, 42 AM.
J. INDUS. MED. 163 (2002), available at http://www.egilman.com/Documents/
publications/screenings.pdf ("I was amazed to discover, that in some of the
screenings, the worker's X-ray had been 'shopped around' to as many as six
radiologists until a slightly positive reading was reported by the last one of
them.").
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risk investment vehicles. For example, credit score averaging
may have been intended to provide a rough measure of the credit-
worthiness of individual borrowers across a mortgage pool, but
aggressive issuers soon realized they could satisfy the criteria by
pooling mortgages that were likely to go into default with those
supported by borrowers with artificially high credit scores.147
3. Distinguishing True Positives and Positive Potential
To appreciate the degree to which this shift may alter claim
opportunities, consider the following thought experiment involving
a product used by one million people. In the absence of exposure,
statistical evidence suggests that roughly 7% (70,000) of the popu-
lation would contract lung cancer in their lifetimes. According to
scientific studies, however, approximately 7.7% (77,000) of those
exposed to the product will contract lung cancer. Thus, the num-
ber of true positives due to exposure to the product will be 7000.
Assume that the damages suffered by all lung cancer victims in the
exposure pool have a range of $200,000 to $20,000,000, with a
mean of $1,500,000 and a median of $1,000,000.
If each case is litigated separately, we may expect consid-
erable variability in verdicts. Only one in eleven lung cancer diag-
noses among those exposed to the product may be attributable to
product exposure, and different juries may reach dramatically dif-
ferent results in roughly comparable cases. Thus, the range of cas-
es in which liability is found may be far higher or lower than the
statistical evidence suggests. Moreover, verdict amounts could be
substantially higher or lower in any given case than expected
across the plaintiff pool due to differences in plaintiffs' education,
age, and other factors influencing damages. In the aggregate,
however, we may expect that some true positives will not be com-
pensated in litigation while those that are not true positives will be
compensated, including some that may involve substantial damag-
es.
146. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT xviii-xxii (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdflGPO-FCIC.pdf.
147. Although others have discussed this pattern in more technical terms,
an excellent layman's account may be found in Michael Lewis, THE BIG SHORT:
INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
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To address the large volume of litigation in this hypothet-
ical, current plaintiffs and the defendant agree to establish a com-
prehensive grid settlement that breaks claims into distinct pools
and allocates roughly equivalent compensation to individual claims
within each pool. In this settlement, the defendant agrees to pay an
amount equal to the average cancer damages figure ($1,500,000)
spread across the number of true positives (7000), or
$10,500,000,000.
In the settlement, defining the evidentiary criteria for expo-
sure, injury, and a causal connection between the two will be criti-
cal. If the settlement focuses exclusively on the first two elements,
the absence of any need to advance a causal link will increase the
potential number of qualifying claims under the settlement by
compensating all users who ultimately contract lung cancer
(77,000), rather than the much smaller number of true positives
(7000). Thus, the per-claim compensation must be reduced to a
level that reflects the actual likelihood of causation-one in elev-
en-or $136,363.64. This amount, of course, is a small fraction
(.68%) of the highest damage claims ($20,000,000) and only 68%
of even the lowest value damage claims ($200,000). At this level,
the settlement is likely to suffer from considerable challenges prior
to approval and, if possible, encourage substantial opt-outs by high
value claims. Thus, if plaintiffs are unwilling to accept the sub-
stantial discount and defendants are unwilling or unable to increase
the pool of funds dedicated to the settlement, the parties must nar-
row the compensation criteria toward the true positive or litigation
positive pool.
Now assume that the scientific literature suggests the addi-
tion of two criteria: 1) exposure to the product for at least one
year; and 2) compensation only to those with a specified form of
lung cancer. This should limit the pool of qualifying claims to no
more than 10,000 claimants without excluding any true positives.
This substantial reduction in the potential claimant pool should, in
theory, increase the potential compensation to each qualifying
claimant dramatically ($1,050,000 per claim) without requiring
additional settlement funding. Moreover, if we assume less than
100% subscription from qualifying claimants, the per-claim com-
pensation for individual claims may be significantly higher. In
sum, the aggregate payment should be sufficient for deterrence
purposes, and the individual compensation levels should be suffi-
cient to encourage substantial buy-in from the true positive pool.
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Both components, however, have limits. First, the one-year
exposure condition may be difficult, if not impossible, to verify in
the real world. In the absence of contemporaneous, objective rec-
ords demonstrating exposure, plaintiffs with qualifying injuries
may nonetheless present claims based on claimed exposure periods
that far exceed reality. On the other hand, requiring objective
proof that may not be available-for example, shopping receipts or
labels from products purchased years earlier-as a condition of
qualification may preclude settlement approval.
Second, limiting compensation to a subset of cancer claims
necessarily involves the inclusion of expert reports, which will
serve a limiting function only to the extent that these claims are
objectively distinguishable from others and that the settlement in-
corporates sufficient monitoring mechanisms to test the veracity of
the reports submitted. As demonstrated in all three of the case
studies above, some doctors have a propensity to over-read medi-
cal records and tests in favor of satisfying fixed criteria, particular-
ly where their opinions are highly subjective. Even when provided
with objectively verifiable standards, the fen-phen case study sug-
gests that at least some doctors may manipulate the data or equip-
ment in a manner that superficially satisfies the fixed criteria.' 48
As a result, the practical potential volume of claims that
may be shaped and advanced as qualifying may exceed settlement
projections dramatically. This is true in spite of the parties' efforts
to limit compensation, using largely objective criteria, to a pool
that is only modestly larger than the pool of true positives. The
question at this point is not whether the plaintiffs have incentives
to do so or intend to do so fraudulently. Rather, the point of this
thought experiment is merely to frame the potential opportunity to
advance bad claims as good in aggregate settlement, even where
the settlement terms appear to limit this potential. Of course, once
the number of apparently compensable claims exceeds projections,
this opportunity and the incentive to continue filing may become
limited as courts reduce compensation or adopt more aggressive
monitoring. In a case with extremely high true positive projec-
tions, however, large volumes of intrinsically weak claims may be
compensated over an extended period of time without discovery.
148. See supra Part II.C.
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B. Strategic and Targeted Development Incentives
If we view predictable evidentiary targets and permissive
monitoring and enforcement systems as generating the opportunity
to advance specious claims, the financial incentive to exploit this
opportunity is obvious: those who advance weak claims stand to
earn additional returns at little risk. Without discounting this ar-
gument as far as it goes, the direct economic advantage of advanc-
ing bad claims does not necessarily suggest that those responsible
do so with knowledge of the specious nature of the claims. Indeed,
if we accept the assertions of several doctors and lawyers involved
in the case studies as true, ignorance of the most disturbing prac-
tices in those cases appears rampant. This is not to suggest that
these self-serving assertions are true, but it does raise an interesting
question as to whether the mass settlement approach encourages a
systemic pattern of rational ignorance. To that end, this section
focuses not only on the direct economic incentives to advance spe-
cious claims, but also the manner in which the process promotes
rational ignorance in claim development.
1. Direct Economic Incentives
For all of their potential efficiencies, mass torts do not strip
away all of the potentially substantial costs associated with estab-
lishing the merit of individual claims. Some costs may be shared
by similar claims within a mass tort, including the costs of investi-
gating the defendants' conduct, scientific evidence establishing a
link between a product or event and certain types of injuries, and
the transaction costs of litigating these and other issues. Other
costs, however, are unique to each claim, including developing the
factual or medical support for an alleged injury and the plaintiff's
exposure to the defendant's product, or other causal link to the de-
fendant's conduct. Discussions of the efficiencies of mass tort liti-
gation focus on common expenses because cost-spreading is at the
heart of the economies of scale that are promised by aggregation,
but individual claim expenses can be substantial.149
149. To illustrate, one firm noted that the cost of producing case-specific
expert medical reports was "unduly burdensome and time-consuming." Memo-
randum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Com-
ply with Pretrial Order No. 29 Requiring Case-Specific Expert Reports for Only
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Against this backdrop, economic incentives to adopt target-
ed development are twofold: they allow firms to generate addi-
tional claims that are compensable under the nominal criteria for
compensation and avoid costs they would otherwise incur in pre-
paring a case for trial. Thus, firms may increase the pool of claims
across which common costs may be spread, thereby reducing the
per-claim cost of development. At the same time, by avoiding cer-
tain claim-specific costs ordinarily associated with litigation, firms
may further reduce their up-front expenses.
The ability to target development to predictable criteria is
significant because it may be far more efficient to increase the
yield of claims within a pool of potential plaintiffs than it is to
identify new prospective plaintiffs. Competition for new clients in
many cases is intense and expensive, particularly after a compre-
hensive settlement is established. 150 This competition may not
only limit the pool of potential plaintiffs available to any one firm
but also increase the potential that plaintiffs with specious but su-
perficially compensable claims under the predictable or fixed evi-
dentiary standard will find representation with a competing firm.
2. Rational Ignorance and Development
The opportunity and potential cost savings associated with
targeted development comes at the expense of potentially valuable
information about the respective strengths and weaknesses of indi-
vidual claims. The question, then, is whether collective settlement
generates an environment in which the cost of developing this in-
formation is greater than the reasonably expected benefits of doing
so. In short, does collective settlement promote rational igno-
rance?
In traditional litigation, aggressive fact development not
only improves the evidentiary support required for any possible
trial but also the firm's information advantage concerning the in-
the Plaintiffs Represented by Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., or Alternatively to
Amend Order to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), at
7, In re Bextra & Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 1699, No. M:05-CV-01699-CRB (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2008) [hereinafter
Weitz & Luxenberg Memorandum].
150. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1374 (1995).
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trinsic merits of individual claims. Lawyers abhor nasty surprises
in litigation, particularly those that they or their clients could or
should have been aware of in advance. Positive and negative in-
formation can serve a valuable function in guiding litigation and
settlement strategy as the case proceeds by allowing firms to peri-
odically reassess the value of a case and determine acceptable exit
strategies and settlement ranges as information improves."' Thus,
a firm that develops cases only to the bare minimum required to
survive summary judgment may dramatically weaken prospects for
recovery by grossly over- or under-valuing their potential mer-
its.152
In aggregate litigation and settlement, however, ignorance
with respect to these facts may be rational, depending on the nature
of certain claims, the settlement structure, and the firm's general
business model. In mandatory settlements, for example, incurring
any costs beyond those required to satisfy the effective settlement
criteria may not yield any additional benefits. Even where low
value claims might be financially viable under a more reliable evi-
dentiary development process, targeting recruiting and develop-
ment to the evidentiary target alone may improve claim yield and
aggregate recoveries to a level that more than offsets the nominal
risk of doing so. In some circumstances, the expected per-claim
recoveries may be so low that even the usual process of distin-
guishing good and bad claims in anticipation of potential litigation
may be too expensive or yield too few claims for spreading com-
mon costs to a level that renders them positive net value claims.
Likewise, as in traditional litigation, we may expect some firms to
adopt a "settlement mill" approach even where it may be possible
to generate greater returns by a more nuanced or tiered develop-
ment strategy.153
If we assume the firm is attempting to maximize its invest-
ment, targeted investment should occur only where a more tradi-
tional case development approach will not be expected to yield
151. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1279 (2006).
152. See id
153. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009) (discussing settlement mills in traditional
litigation).
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higher recoveries. Thus, the option to obtain recovery from a fixed
global settlement should not encourage uniform targeted develop-
ment where those holding strong claims can opt out and obtain
significantly higher recoveries in the tort system.
Even the investment-maximizing firm, however, may adopt
distinct development tracks for claims within the same case. Thus,
the case evaluation process may put some claims on a litigation
development track and preserve less promising claims in the firm's
inventory but place them on a targeted development track. At dif-
ferent points in pre-settlement litigation or case-specific develop-
ment, once promising claims may appear less promising and shift
to a less thorough development approach going forward. Thus, a
firm may limit its development costs by tiered development strate-
gies without sacrificing its ability to advance the strongest claims
at trial or its potential to leverage a larger volume of less devel-
oped, but potentially compensable, inventory claims.
To illustrate, assume a lawyer in the early 1990s has been
screening out asbestos claims that he believes to be weak and de-
veloping the cases he accepts as he would any other case. These
costs include obtaining follow-up medical reports, developing doc-
umentary records supporting each client's work history, and inter-
viewing potential witnesses who can support his clients' claims.
He discovers that other plaintiffs file lower value claims that can
survive motions to dismiss and obtain settlement without these
additional costs. If he decides to forego these additional steps for
any of his low value claims, he can save considerable time and
expense to both his own and his clients' benefit.154 He can also
add claims to his inventory that his competitors are otherwise ac-
cruing. To the extent that some defendants refuse to settle or de-
mand this additional evidence as a condition of settlement, he has
the option of developing this additional evidence, dismissing these
defendants and settling with the remaining defendants, or using the
leverage from his stronger claims that are trial ready to obtain an
inventory settlement covering all of his claims.
154. This assumes that the financial expenses may be deducted from the
clients' recovery in addition to the lawyer's fee.
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C. Targeted Development and Manufactured Claim Practices
Predictability of compensation alters the playing field be-
cause it transforms the potential adverse selection problem in col-
lective settlement into an opportunity to strategically tailor recruit-
ing and development to the superficial satisfaction of the effective
qualification criteria. The advocate's role of presenting claims in
the light most favorable to the client tracks common practice in
traditional civil litigation,155 but the threat of adversarial testing of
this one-sided evidence may be perceived as limited or non-
existent for at least some of the firm's inventory. Claims presented
with all of the zeal contemplated by the adversary process may run
roughshod over settlement regimes that lack the capacity or will to
challenge them. Also, systems that create opportunities to obtain
recovery without meaningful claim review generate incentives for
firms to take a relaxed approach to screening the claims that they
bring. 156
Although firms can afford to be indifferent to intrinsic
claim quality under the circumstances, opportunity and incentive
alone do not make corruption of the recruiting and development
process inevitable. Each of the case studies in Part II of this Arti-
cle demonstrate how multiple participants worked together to gen-
erate specious claims in large volumes, but they also involved
many more professionals who continued to approach recruiting and
development without cutting corners or advancing volumes of
claims that were impossible to build without the services of those
155. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability:
Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 915, 923 (2004) (discussing
attorneys' "freedom to err" on the side of their clients in the adversary system);
Gerald Walpin, America's Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do
Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 175, 177 (2003) ("Zealous, faithful advo-
cacy means the obligation to search out all favorable evidence, to seek, neutral-
ize or destroy all unfavorable evidence, and to press the most favorable interpre-
tation of the law for his client.").
156. Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Set-
tlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 547-48 (1991)
("Having established a system in which all cases that survive a motion to dis-
miss are settled for a certain percentage of the stakes, plaintiffs' attorneys have
less incentive to screen cases carefully. Thus, the existence of a 'going rate'
encourages the filing of more, and weaker, suits than attorneys would bring
under the conventional economic model.").
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who did so.157 Even within those plaintiff groups that advanced
specious claims, the case studies do not clearly establish how many
of the actual participants were aware of the corrupt practices in-
volved, and those who were directly involved in the most ques-
tionable conduct arguably neutralized the corrupt nature of their
actions.
The patterns and practices outlined in the case studies in
Part II tend to track common themes found in research concerning
other forms of group conduct that breaks from societal norms:
opportunity, incentive, and justification. In oversubscription
resulting from dubious claim filings, predictable evidentiary targets
create the opportunity, and targeted development promises consid-
erable financial benefits. The distinguishing factor among those
who embraced increasingly dubious recruiting and development
practices is the degree to which sub-group rationalizations were
sufficient to neutralize individual or firm concerns about their pro-
priety.
1. The Targeted Development Spiral
At first glance, predictability is significant only inasmuch
as it allows firms to avoid unnecessary costs. The ability to avoid
claim-specific inquiries and costs that are not required to create a
qualifying evidentiary record under the collective settlement is part
of the presumptive value of collective settlements inasmuch as
they replace expensive evidentiary support with less expensive
alternatives. For example, as seen in the fen-phen global settle-
ment, collective settlements may only require verified forms that
include fill-in-the-blank responses in lieu of the expensive medical
expert reports-and associated battles over those reports-that
might be expected at trial.
157. Indeed, some high-profile plaintiffs' lawyers and doctors actively
lobbied against some of the practices discussed in this Article. See Asbestos
Litigation: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 75, at 24-26
(prepared statement of Steven Kazan) (criticizing recruiting practices of entre-
preneurial mass tort firms); Egilman, supra note 145, at 163.
158. See generally Ruth V. Aguilera & Abhijeet K. Vadera, The Dark Side
of Authority: Antecedents, Mechanisms, and Outcomes of Organizational Cor-
ruption, 77 J. Bus. ETH. 431 (2008) (drawing upon the Opportunity-Motivation-
Justification model of crime to explain corporate corruption).
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The danger in targeted development is that the most effi-
cient mechanisms for generating the required evidence may also be
among the least reliable measures of merit. For example, although
it may be possible to employ traditional medical screenings to
identify potential victims and subsequently develop their claims in
a manner that is consistent with accepted medical practice, this
approach is far more time-consuming and would yield far fewer
clients than litigation screenings.
With competition among doctors and screening companies
focused on yield rather than quality, this disconnect suggests that
the quality of diagnoses generated in the market for screening ser-
vices will reach the lowest predictably compensable level over
time. Any screening company that generated 5% positive diagno-
sis yields during the heyday of asbestos screening, for example,
would quickly be out of business where other firms provided
equally compensable diagnoses for 50 to 90% of the individuals
they screened.159
Targeted development can be particularly problematic
where the volume of potential low or negative expected value
claims is high. In these cases, the financial incentives to maximize
volume and control costs encourage the use of doctors or service
providers who generate the highest yields through the most finan-
cially expedient means possible. The result, as demonstrated in
asbestos and silica litigation, is a virtual avalanche of newly gener-
ated claims that satisfy the evidentiary target but leave it virtually
impossible for anyone-courts, defendants, or even the law firms
advancing them-to distinguish the good claims on merit. The
low sunk costs per claim may make it more rational to simply jetti-
son any claims that are challengedi1o than to press forward with
litigation, even if some of those claims might have merit.
159. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 526-30 (noting screen-
ing doctor positive yields of 50-90%).
160. Given this cost consideration, it may not be surprising that so many
silica and asbestos claimants accepted dismissal rather than attempting to build
sufficient evidentiary support to satisfy the higher standards adopted in some
states and courts following the Silica MDL. See Aricka Flowers, Judge
Robreno: Cleaning Up Clogged Asbestos MDL, SOUTHEAST TEXAS RECORD
(Aug. 5, 2009, 11:56 AM), http://www.setexasrecord.com/news/220412-judge-
robreno-cleaning-up-clogged-asbestos-mdl (noting dismissal of thousands of
asbestos claims); supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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As demonstrated by the asbestos and fen-phen case studies,
systemic problems arise when these mechanisms expand the pool
of compensable claims far beyond expectations. The key here is
that it was not only possible to target real or perceived criteria but
that doing so generated a volume of claims that could not be man-
aged efficiently without (a) reducing payments to a level that de-
nied legitimate claim holders their rightful share of any recovery,
(b) demanding additional funding, thus denying defendants the
peace they bargained for, or (c) embracing costly and time-
consuming verification procedures that might offset much, if not
all, of the transaction cost avoidance benefits expected from set-
tlement.
2. Neutralizing Normative Concerns
Group corruption research suggests that one possible dis-
tinction between the different subgroups in these cases is the de-
gree to which those who advanced specious claims embraced vari-
ous neutralizing justifications and procedures for their specious
claims. This research has long demonstrated that groups and sub-
groups "can develop norms that are far removed from generally
accepted societal norms."1 6 1
Specifically, although other justifications appear to be pre-
sent, the neutralizing justifications prevalent in the case studies fall
into two rough categories: denial of wrongfulness and denial of
responsibility.162 In this context, denial of wrongfulness refers to
those justifications that deny the illegality, immorality, harmful
nature, or victim of the conduct. Denial of responsibility captures
those justifications that deflect personal responsibility for any par-
ticular conduct, including the belief that they were bound to take
specific actions due to their role or the common rationalization that
"everybody does it."l 6 3 These justifications tend to have a cumula-
161. See Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, supra note 4, at 137.
162. This framework collapses elements of those advanced by Aguilera &
Vadera, supra note 158, at 431-37, and Ashforth & Anand, supra note 3, at 16-
22.
163. See Aguilera & Vadera, supra note 158, at 436; Ashforth & Anand,
supra note 3, at 18.
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tive effect or work in concert to neutralize potential concerns about
the participant's role.' 64
a. Denial of Wrongfulness
As Professors Aguilera and Vadera note, "individuals who
use rationalization justifications tend to argue that their behaviors
are not criminal as laws and regulations codifying their behaviors
as illegal may not exist, may be dated or not enforced, or their ap-
plicability may be questionable."' 65  Commentators and courts
acknowledged asbestos screenings and their perceived shortcom-
ings for years before the Silica MDL. Yet, courts and defendants
continued to allow the claims to proceed and settle, often without
meaningful challenge. Similarly, the pattern of lax ethical en-
forcement against those who submitted dubious asbestos claims-
and, subsequently, silica claimsl 66-reinforced the perspective that
mass torts were different.167 In sum, the resulting claims could be
perceived as non-frivolous because any claim that can be reasona-
bly presented as warranting settlement is, by definition, a non-
frivolous claim.' 68
Even participants who suspected that some of the claims
were weak or frivolous could easily reason that the defendants "de-
served their fate" due to their own illegal or unethical conduct.169
Asbestos, silica, and fen-phen litigation all involved products that
were responsible for the premature deaths and life-altering injuries
of thousands of victims, and the companies involved were easy
targets for vilification. Indeed, after claim patterns are criticized or
even entire cases are debunked as scientifically implausible, the
164. See Zyglidopoulos et al., supra note 3, at 70.
165. See Aguilera & Vadera, supra note 158, at 436.
166. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing the influence
of "slippage between behavior and rules" in enforcement on perceptions of le-
gality and propriety).
167. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of
Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159 (1995)
(discussing ambiguities of ethical issues in mass tort litigation).
168. See Choctaw, Inc. v. Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis & Dove, 965
So. 2d 1041, 1045-47 (Miss. 2007) (agreeing with firm's assertion that claims
that targeted settlement criteria were historically paid and, accordingly, not
"frivolous" by definition).
169. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 3, at 18-20.
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presumption that the companies nevertheless "got what they de-
served" may continue unabated.
b. Denial of Responsibility
In retrospect, it seems clear that judicial and academic per-
ceptions of accepted practice in the mass torts discussed were not
in line with the offending lawyers' and doctors' understandings.
Lawyers do not simply switch hats from zealous advocates to dili-
gent gatekeepers once a settlement is available, and few of the
lawyers' actions in these cases conclusively demonstrate more than
a willingness to take the information at their disposal at face value.
At the same time, with a few notable exceptions, most of the doc-
tors involved operated under a common, 170 but mistaken, view of
their role in the process as "hired guns," rather than objective med-
ical analysts.
Even if these perceptions of accepted practice were mistak-
en, they have been reinforced by a long history of accepting similar
conduct in litigation. Doctors and other experts have been widely
characterized as "hired guns" for one side or the other for as long
as any of us alive today have been involved in civil litigation prac-
tice. 17 1 The practices that Judge Jack condemned in the Silica
MDL were occasionally recognized, albeit rarely punished, during
170. Michael A. Silverstein, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13,
2005, at Al 3 (defending organization's decision to honor screening doctor criti-
cized by Judge Jack in the Silica MDL because he was merely acting as an ex-
pert witness in that case).
171. See generally David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science out ofAsbes-
tos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 11, 13 (2003) (arguing that "hired gun" physi-
cians misdiagnose lung abnormalities and misidentify causation in asbestos
litigation); Lee Mickus, Discovery of Work Product Disclosed to a Testifying
Expert Under the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 27
CREIGHTON L. REv. 773, 792 n.85 (1994) ("An expert witness eager to please
his employer may sometimes form his opinion solely on the basis of incomplete
information disclosed to him by counsel."); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Liti-
gation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 301,
348-86 (1992) (discussing use of expert testimony on both sides in Bendectin
litigation); Jeffrey J. Parker, Note, Contingent Expert Witness Fees: Access and
Legitimacy, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1363 (1991) (discussing hired gun experts and
expert bias).
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the fifteen years prior to her decision.172 To be clear, this is not to
say that all of these activities were ethical or even legal; it is mere-
ly recognition that the perception of what constitutes an accepted
practice by lawyers tends to be shaped more by recognized patterns
than by unspoken expectations and rules that are rarely enforced.
Denial of responsibility can be problematic in these cases
because the specialization and division of responsibility that gener-
ate considerable efficiencies in mass tort litigation also yield a po-
tential compartmentalization problem. 173 Compartmentalization of
responsibility enables participants to rationalize and avoid consid-
eration of broader issues with the process. 174 Even if participants
172. For example, one court noted significant concerns with comparable
practices in 1990. See Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6710, at *6 (D. Kan. May 30, 1990) ("For all purposes,
Raymark and this court reasonably assumed, given the defendant attorneys'
professional responsibilities and Rule 11 compliance, that they would only sub-
mit claims of at least some merit, but surely would not recklessly acquiesce in
the filing of a constant, steady flow of faulty claims. As this opinion will
demonstrate, such is apparently the case. As stated at the time of hearing on the
motions, this claim process appears to be a 'professional farce!' The process
makes a mockery of the practices of law and medicine! Indeed, if this court
were now to acquiesce in any of them it would make a 'laughingstock' of the
court!").
173. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 633 (S.D.
Tex. 2005) (noting how the compartmentalization of screening duties allowed
one silica screening doctor to "reconcile his acquiescence in false diagnosing
language"). The court continued:
Repeatedly, the diagnosing doctors testified as to their blind
(and, as it happens, unfounded) faith that other physicians had
taken the necessary steps to legitimize their diagnoses. By di-
viding the diagnosing process among multiple people, most of
whom had no medical training and none of whom had full
knowledge of the entire process, no one was able to take full
responsibility over the accuracy of the process. This is assem-
bly line diagnosing. And it is an ingenious method of grossly
inflating the number of positive diagnoses.
Id. at 633-34.
174. Donald Palmer, Extending the Process Model of Collective Corrup-
tion, 28 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 107, 115 (2008) (noting that division of
labor and requiring participants to focus on their specific tasks "substitute for
more time consuming mindful and rational cost benefit or normative analysis
that might lead organizational participants to eschew wrongful courses of ac-
tion").
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harbor suspicions, stepping beyond their respective roles to exam-
ine the process diminishes the efficiency gained by the division of
labor and may be viewed as bad form-an implicit suggestion that
one's colleagues or superiors are unprofessional, unethical, incom-
petent, or worse-within the system.' 75 Moreover, subgroups and
individuals frequently believe that it is not in their best interests to
ask questions or otherwise overstep their roles, particularly where
they are fungible players in the process.' 76
Compartmentalization presents significant problems for
managing specious claims through ethical controls. Regardless of
whether the systemic ignorance is inadvertent or by design, it may
afford those involved a level of protection against liability and re-
inforce the perception that outside criticism is overblown. 77 Out-
side observers and others involved in the process may never know
whether a participant is an ostrich-one who buried her head in the
sand-or a fox-"a grand schemer who fully intend[ed] to follow
the path of wrongdoing, and who contrived his ignorance only as a
liability-screening precaution, like a good getaway car."178  Put
differently, even if courts and disciplinary authorities diligently
pursue those that intentionally advance specious claims, they may
be less comfortable doing so with respect to those who may be
175. See id ("The division of labor also diffuses responsibility, such that
participants in one part of an organization sometimes do not feel obligated to (in
fact, might even be forbidden from) point(ing) out the wrongful character of the
behavior of employees in another part of the organization.").
176. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 3, at 25-34 (discussing socializa-
tion of corruption across groups).
177. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 220 (2007)
(discussing "willful" ignorance and its potential for liability avoidance); Stephen
Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New Realm
of Federal Regulation ofLegal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 609, 638 (2003) ("At-
torneys might avoid knowledge of certain information because they believe that
ignorance permits them better to defend the client or to circumvent ethical obli-
gations."); Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-Finding, Ethical Decision-Making
and the Methodology ofLaw, 45 ST. Louis L.J. 1185, 1204 (2001) ("Since every
ethical rule requires a factual predicate and lawyers themselves determine
whether such a factual predicate exists, attorneys can control the process of ethi-
cal decision-making through fact-finding. This deceptively simple point-rarely
acknowledged in ethics discourse-demonstrates the extraordinary impact of
fact-finding on ethical decision-making.").
178. See LUBAN, supra note 177, at 220-21.
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viewed as simply being zealous advocates, and the inability to
clearly distinguish the two may provide cover for the foxes.
Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that
compartmentalization has been an effective barrier to sanctions in
the cases discussed. Although there may be compelling reasons to
conclude that some of the attorneys involved in the Silica MDL
intentionally manufactured specious claims,179 the compartmental-
ization of responsibility has served as an effective "getaway car" to
date.so Likewise, notwithstanding concerns about the high corre-
lation between specious fen-phen claims and certain law firms,18
the only criminal and civil litigation claims filed to date focus on
the doctors and others whose actions are difficult to explain as any-
thing other than intentional fraud or misrepresentation.' 82
179. As Judge Jack concluded:
The record does not reveal who originally devised this
scheme, but it is clear that the lawyers, doctors and screening
companies were all willing participants. And if the lawyers
turned a blind eye to the mechanics of the scheme, each law-
yer had to know that Mississippi was not experiencing the
worst outbreak of silicosis in recorded history. Each lawyer
had to know that he or she was filing at least some claims that
falsely alleged silicosis. The fact that some claims are likely
legitimate, and the fact that the lawyers could not precisely
identify which claims were false, cannot absolve them of re-
sponsibility for these mass misdiagnoses which they have
dumped into the judicial system.
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635-36 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
180. Id. at 679 (noting that sanctions ordered in that case were "substan-
tially less than the total amount of damages" caused by the specious filings); see
also RAND SILICA REPORT, supra note 78, at 18 ("In the end, only one of the
plaintiffs' firms involved in the silica litigation ended up paying a penalty for
their practices during the silica litigation. And the sanction levied against that
firm was small."); David J. Kahne, Curbing the Abuser, Not the Abuse: A Call
for Greater Professional Accountability and Stricter Ethical Guidelines for
Class Action Lawyers, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 741 (2006) ("However,
while Judge Jack's proclamation and the new legislation have sought to elimi-
nate frivolous claims and compensate those truly harmed, nothing has been done
to penalize the clearly unethical conduct prevalent amongst lawyers in mass tort
adjudication.").
181. See NAGAREDA, supra note 6, at 145.
182. See, e.g., Tai Indictment, supra note 116 (criminal action against
doctor involve in fen-phen specious claim diagnoses); Crouse Complaint, supra
note 116 (RICO action against doctor filed by fen-phen settlement trust); see
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IV. MANAGING OVERSUBSCRIPTION IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION
AND SETTLEMENT
Framing specious claim filings as merely the product of
opportunistic plaintiffs or lawyers provides some bright lines and
suggests relatively easy solutions. If we assume that claims are
objectively fixed types, the incentive structure for advancing spe-
cious claims may be altered by enforcing ethical rules and other-
wise penalizing those who advance them. At the same time, con-
trolling the opportunity to advance dubious claims through largely
objective evidentiary criteria and aggressive audit mechanisms
may be viewed as sufficient to deter the rise of specious claim
markets that threaten the stability of a settlement.
The foregoing analysis reinforces the view that targeting
opportunities and incentives to advance dubious claims are im-
portant components of controlling oversubscription, but it also re-
veals their limits. Modern ethical and procedural rules tend to fo-
cus on bad apples who are either aware or should be aware of their
misconduct, but this focus leaves substantial gaps in coverage.
Likewise, the best opportunity-limiting controls employed to date
have been plagued by practices that exploited blind spots that go
undiscovered for months or years when verification mechanisms
are static.
In short, an effective post-settlement verification system
must not only account for intentional frivolous filings but also cli-
ent recruiting and development practices that shield lead firms
from knowing that any given claim is frivolous. This requires a
more aggressive mechanism for identifying gaps between ex ante
settlement claim expectations and the manner in which the qualifi-
cation criteria are satisfied in practice, as well as the degree to
which specific repeat players appear to advance colorable but
manufactured evidentiary support. Against this backdrop, this Part
evaluates modern aggregate litigation practice and proposes basic
mechanisms for discouraging the emergence of specious claim
markets through collective settlement design.
also Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Trans-
formation of Mississippi's Legal Climate, 24 Miss. C. L. REv. 393, 400-01
(2005) (discussing prosecution of those involved in fabricating evidence submit-
ted to separate fen-phen settlement plans).
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A. Pre-Settlement Opportunism in Modern Practice
Tort reform and judicial recognition of the need to rein in
certain practices have altered the mass tort landscape in recent
years. Key state court decisions have established more restrictive
joinder's3 and pleadingl84 requirements. Moreover, many states
have passed laws that require plaintiffs to demonstrate actual im-
pairment in order to initiate certain types of suits,185 and several
courts have adopted inactive dockets for claims advanced by
asymptomatic asbestos plaintiffs. 186  In addition, some well-
publicized decisions have scaled back the substantive aspects of
"special asbestos law."1 8 7 As a result, filing rates in some of the
former hotbeds of asbestos litigation have plummeted.'"' Like-
183. See, e.g., Brickman, Litigation Screenings, supra note 46, at 1291
(discussing Mississippi's approach); Victor E. Schwartz et al., West Virginia as
a Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in State Courts, 111 W.
VA. L. REv. 757, 768 (2009) (comparing Mississippi's reforms to those of West
Virginia).
184. See, e.g., Maron & Jones, supra note 47, at 280-81; Basenberg &
Bankester, supra note 15, at 74 (discussing change to "shotgun-style complaint"
practice in Mississippi).
185. See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Cri-
sis: The Tide Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INs. L.J. 477, 492 (2006) (noting
that Ohio, Georgia, Texas, Florida, Kansas, and South Carolina have adopted
medical criteria laws).
186. See id at 489-91 ("Inactive dockets were first adopted in the late
1980s and early 1990s in jurisdictions that were experiencing large numbers of
filings by the unimpaired-Massachusetts (September 1986), Chicago (March
1991), and Baltimore City (December 1992). Since 2002, the list of jurisdictions
with inactive asbestos dockets has grown to include Cleveland, Ohio (March
2006); Minnesota (coordinated litigation) (June 2005); St. Clair County, Illinois
(February 2005); Portsmouth, Virginia (August 2004); Madison County, Illinois
(January 2004); Syracuse, New York (January 2003); New York City (Decem-
ber 2002); and Seattle, Washington (December 2002)." (footnote omitted)).
187. For example, Texas embraced a more restrictive exposure standard
for asbestos personal injury suits in 2007. See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232
S.W.3d 765, 773 (Tex. 2007).
188. See, e.g., Bates & Mullin, supra note 76, at 40-42 (discussing Missis-
sippi and Texas and concluding that "[l]ess than 10 percent, and more likely less
than five percent of the historical non-malignant claims would have been filed if
the current tort environment had prevailed over the last two decades").
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wise, the Class Action Fairness Act' 89 has effectively addressed
concerns about the certification of nationwide class actions in state
courts,190 and the pleading standards announced by the Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly'91 and Ashcroft v. Iqball92
impose limits that should effectively limit shotgun-style com-
plaints in federal court. 193
Moreover, individual judges continue to refine the process
of managing aggregate litigation, including the use of staggered
claim-specific discovery devices that generate far more infor-
mation about not only the specific allegations underlying individu-
al claims, but also the nature of the evidence supporting those alle-
gations. In many mass tort cases, plaintiffs are required to file
plaintiff fact sheets ("PFS") or comparable documentation that
specifies basic information for each individual claim under pre-
trial case management orders.194  The required information will
often include basic client identification information, information
189. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1711-15 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
190. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., New World of Class Actions: CAFA,
Exxon, and Open Issues, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2005, at 25.
189. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
190. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
193. Recent Supreme Court opinions have been interpreted to require far
more than the boilerplate allegations that dominated mass tort pleadings previ-
ously. See, e.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Illinois, 520 F.3d
797, 802-03 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[Twombly] teaches that a defendant should not be
forced to undergo costly discovery unless the complaint contains enough detail,
factual or argumentative, to indicate that the plaintiff has a substantial case.");
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 371, 415-26 (2010).
194. A typical PFS process was outlined by the Ninth Circuit:
CMO 19 ordered plaintiffs to complete a Plaintiff s Fact Sheet
in all respects and serve it within 45 days after transmission of
the blank PFS. For cases where no PFS was returned, De-
fendants' Liaison Counsel were to send a letter warning that
the case was subject to dismissal, after which the plaintiff
would have an additional 15 days to comply. If a PFS were
received on time but was not completed in all respects, a defi-
ciency letter was to be sent allowing an additional 15 days to
serve a completed PFS and warning that the case was subject
to dismissal if one were not received.
In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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about the nature of the alleged injuries, the date of onset of the in-
juries, the identity of the person making the initial diagnosis, the
products used or exposed to, and other relevant personal, work, or
medical information.19 5 A claimant's failure to submit this infor-
mation by the deadline may result in dismissal of her claim or fi-
* 196
nancial sanctions.
PFS requirements are a significant improvement over in-
formal aggregation and bankruptcy practices that have effectively
taken the mere presence of claims as proof that pre-litigation case
195. For example, Administrative Order No. 12 in the Asbestos MDL
requires "a report identifying each plaintiff by full name, date of birth, last four
digits of plaintiffs [sic] SSN, and a statement indicating the status of the plaintiff
in the case before the Court." Amended Administrative Order No. 12A at 1, In
re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. MDL 875 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27,
2009), http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL875/adordl2.pdf.
It also requires the identification of "each and every prior or pending court or
administrative action" brought on account of the alleged injuries. Id In addi-
tion, plaintiffs must "submit to the court a copy of the medical diagnosing report
or opinion upon which the plaintiff now relies for prosecution of the claims as if
to withstand a dispositive motion," and the objective and subjective data that
support them "shall be identified and descriptively set out within the report or
opinion." Id. at 2.
196. See, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 867 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding dismissal based on failure
to submit compliant PFS by the deadline); In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d
at 1234, 1237-38, 1240 (same); Bacher v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, No. 2:09-CV-
00665, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119305 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 18, 2009) (sanctioning
counsel for failing to comply with PFS order); Case Management Order No. 1,
In re Oral Sodium Phosphate Solution-Based Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:09-SP-
80000 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/assets/Clerks_
Officeand CourtRecords/MDL/2066/CMOl.pdf (establishing procedures for
compliance with PFS requirement, including provision for dismissing claims for
noncompliance); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-CV-1507-WRW,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18773 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 27, 2009) (order noting potential
sanctions, including attorneys fees, and dismissal of cases with prejudice if PFS
deadline was not met); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1789, No.
1:08-CV-04901, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59690 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009) (dis-
missing claim with prejudice for failing to submit PFS by deadline); In re Bextra
& Celebrex Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1699, No.
05-CV-01699 CRB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7807 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2007)
(same); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 223 F.R.D.109, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(same), vacated in part MDL No. 1348, No. 03 Civ. 1756, 2004 WL 1700618
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 27, 2004).
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investigations have taken place, but they may not reveal sufficient
information to distinguish good and bad claims. PFS forms vary
considerably from one case to the next, and they are not, of course,
a substitute for traditional discovery. In most cases, they provide
only limited opportunities for evaluating the relative merits of in-
dividual claims or their supporting evidence.197
Similarly, more courts have embraced the use of Lone
Pine 98 orders or comparable orders to mandate disclosure of key
evidentiary support for individual claims. 99 Most often, these or-
ders seek proof of specific causation; for example, expert medical
reports demonstrating a causal relationship between a defendant's
product and the plaintiffs injury.200  The orders routinely afford
plaintiffs a limited time frame to file the required information or
reports and establish procedures for dismissing claims for which
this information is not provided.20 1 Although courts may issue
197. See BEISNER & MILLER, supra note 18, at 17 ("Fact sheets help pro-
vide an early, bird's eye view of the nature of the litigation, but they do not pro-
vide all of the information necessary to evaluate the merits of plaintiffs' claims.
Some claimants provide false or incomplete answers, reasoning that among
thousands of pending cases, their answers will never be scrutinized. Other
claimants may simply decline to devote the time and effort needed to completely
answer the questions.").
198. So-called "Lone Pine Orders" take their name from a case manage-
ment order entered in a New Jersey state court order that required submission of
basic information about individual claims. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-
33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986).
199. See James P. Muehlberger & Boyd S. Hoekel, An Overview of Lone
Pine Orders in Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 366, 370-73 (2004)
(identifying and discussing use of Lone Pine orders in different state and federal
courts). Courts may also adopt comparable orders requiring expedited discovery
from defendants. See, e.g., Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co., 569 F. Supp. 2d 351,
354 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the application of Lone Pine orders).
200. See generally Muehlberger & Hoekel, supra note 199, at 366-67.
201. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 Fed. App'x. 391, 397-98 (5th
Cir. 2010) (finding trial judge did not abuse discretion by dismissing claims that
did not satisfy medical report requirement in pre-trial order); Acuna v. Brown &
Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of claims).
But see McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 384, 388-89 (S.D. Ind. 2009)
(approving Lone Pine order without procedure for automatic dismissal but not-
ing potential defense cost assessments to plaintiffs if claims were subsequently
dismissed on summary judgment). Courts have been willing to extend time
frames where justified, but these extensions are increasingly limited and are
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Lone Pine orders at any stage of the proceedings, they typically
avoid doing so where existing case management orders fill the
same role or the disclosures sought by defendants are perceived as
premature.202 Moreover, Lone Pine orders may be issued shortly
203before or after a comprehensive settlement is reached, and then
be limited to non-settling claims, leading some firms that are the
target of these orders to complain that they are punitive or de-
signed to strong-arm plaintiffs into "lowball" settlements.204
The emphasis on pretrial consolidation in multi-district liti-
gation increases the potential for comprehensive settlement in that
forum, and the manner in which these cases are litigated may place
a greater emphasis on distinguishing claims based on merit. Col-
lectively, the practices discussed suggest that diligent defendants
may effectively control the asbestos and silica development mod-
el-targeting only an anticipated nominal standard without pre-
serving a cost-effective means of distinguishing good and bad
frequently referenced in support of orders dismissing non-compliant claims with
prejudice.
202. See In re Digitek Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 249, 258-59 (S.D. W.
Va. 2010) (rejecting request for Lone Pine order due to relatively early stage in
the case and the "number of measures" adopted to advance the litigation previ-
ously); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 (E.D. La.
2008) ("In crafting a Lone Pine order, a court should strive to strike a balance
between efficiency and equity. Lone Pine orders may not be appropriate in eve-
ry case and, even when appropriate, they may not be suitable at every stage of
the litigation. For example, in the present case, a Lone Pine order may not have
been appropriate at an earlier stage before any discovery had taken place since
little was known about the structure, nature and effect of Vioxx by anyone other
than perhaps the manufacturer of the drug."); Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., No.
06-1080 (JAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36515, at *42-43 (D.N.J. May 17, 2007)
(rejecting motion for Lone Pine style order that "would require over 700 Plain-
tiffs to produce affidavits from qualified environmental experts and licensed
physicians, while Defendants were required to produce no discovery" and re-
quiring plaintiffs to "submit a Rule 26(a)(1) simple statement including the 'na-
ture and extent of injuries suffered,' their treating physicians, and medical au-
thorizations").
203. See Pretrial Orders Nos. 29, 30, and 31, In re Bextra and Celebrex
Mktg. Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL. No. 1699, No. M:05-cv-
01699 (N.D. Cal. 2008). For a similar approach, see Pretrial Order No. 121, In
re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2007-MD-1871,
2010 WL 4720335 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2010).
204. See Weitz & Luxenberg Memorandum, supra note 149, at 7.
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claims internally-by demanding higher evidentiary standards in
any firm-specific or global settlement and seeking orders requiring
Lone Pine submissions from those who attempt to hold out. Plain-
tiffs' firms that continue to marginalize development in this way or
otherwise fail to verify the reliability of their experts' conclusions
thus run the risk that their costs will be inflated rather than re-
duced, their cases dismissed, or both.
These changes reflect a larger shift in courts' and defend-
ants' attention to rooting out specious claims that should encourage
firms to avoid marginal claim development strategies prior to
global settlement. By improving opportunities to gauge the quality
of a firm's claims, these practices strengthen the value of individu-
al merit in building repeat players' reputation in settlement negoti-
ations.205 Claim-specific inquiry options allow defense counsel,
who also tend to be repeat players, to observe and distinguish the
firms that advance primarily strong claims from others, and firms
that effectively distinguish good and bad claims and develop them
accordingly are better positioned to absorb the costs of advancing
this information.206 Thus, firms known as effective gatekeepers
should enjoy an advantage in negotiating individual or inventory
settlement terms, and firms with equally poor reputations may find
future settlement values discounted, if settlement is forthcoming at
all.
B. Settlement Terms and Administration
Continued use of fixed qualification criteria and limiting
options for inquiry into the evidentiary support for claims submit-
ted to a global settlement remain imperfect but frequently neces-
sary realities of any system designed to resolve a large volume of
claims effectively. Moreover, these settlements still occur before
detailed claim-specific investigation, even when the available evi-
dence suggests that the underlying claims are questionable. 207
205. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Con-
tingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 363, 365 (1998) ("[C]oncerns about reputation
operate to constrain opportunism, at least somewhat.").
206. See, e.g., Brian L. Connelly, et al., Signaling Theory: A Review and
Assessment, 37 J. MGMT. 39, 41-45 (2011) (discussing signaling theory and its
various applications).
207. For example, in the four years during which the World Trade Center
litigation was pending, fewer than sixty of the roughly nine thousand claims had
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Standing alone, these facts suggest that future collective settle-
ments will continue to have unanticipated blind spots that may be
exploited, particularly given the substantial degree of creativity
and flexibility of mass tort practice.
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the fen-phen global set-
tlement provides some evidence of the utility of controlling for
evidentiary malleability. In its favor, the settlement was not con-
tent to rely on the mere fact that medical evidence was attested to
by a doctor but provided objectively verifiable criteria to guide the
doctor's assessment. 208 Once the audit began, this objective com-
ponent was helpful not only in distinguishing good and bad claims,
but also in distinguishing some would-be foxes from ostriches.
The former has helped mitigate the damage of specious claim fil-
ings, while the latter has supported civil and criminal actions
against the doctors responsible for generating large numbers of
these claims.
One significant flaw in the fen-phen settlement is that the
deterrence message did not reach its intended target: the doctors
responsible for generating dubious medical reports. Neither the
medical assessment form, nor the other documents provided to the
doctors, suggests that the settlement is any different from any other
proceeding in which the doctor may be involved, and nowhere on
these forms is it suggested that the claims will be subjected to a
mandatory audit. Indeed, precisely because it is viewed as a set-
tlement form, doctors may have reasonably believed that their
work would be subjected to less scrutiny. To that end, the view
that these doctors simply rolled the dice in manipulating the objec-
tive data overlooks the fact that the doctors who continued to sub-
been investigated through the adversary process to a significant degree, and the
first public signs of potentially specious claim filings in that case came from an
independent Associated Press investigation into a limited subset of claims. See
David B. Caruso, Credibility in Question for Some 9/11 Health Damage Suits,
BosTON.COM (Feb. 8, 2010), http://articles.boston.com/2010-02-08/news/
29326430 1 ground-zero-workers-trials. A comprehensive settlement was
reached shortly after this report and before the planned bellwether trials were to
begin. See Mireya Navarro, Deal Is Reached on Health Costs of 9/11 Workers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at Al ("The first 12 cases were scheduled to come
to trial on May 16 in Manhattan, and those trials will now not take place.").
208. See supra Part II.C.1.
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mit specious claims failed to appreciate the risks they were taking
in doing so.
Targeting the message to specific participants in collective
settlement may not fully deter specious claim filings, but it should
discourage ostriches from burying their heads in the sand and force
foxes to take steps that objectively reveal their intent to engage in
misconduct. In the fen-phen case, this would require little more
than an acknowledgement from the medical professional that she
understands that other medical professionals will review all sub-
missions to ensure compliance with the objective criteria. In other
settings, comparable acknowledgement of the likelihood of audit
and potential sanctions for misleading or fraudulent submissions-
beyond boilerplate language concerning the submissions being
submitted on penalty of perjury-should serve the same purpose.
C. Audit Design and Flexibility
Audits are often viewed as being in conflict with the goal
of streamlining administration and reducing transaction costs, and
plaintiffs and settlement administrators frequently oppose settle-
ment terms or motions seeking claim information that may impose
significant costs.209 Conversely, the absence of any mechanism to
ensure that the claims submitted are, in fact, compliant with the
terms and intent of the settlement invites rampant filing of specious
or frivolous claims. Thus, an effective audit system must strike a
balance between controlling costs and deterring and disallowing
payment of specious claims.
There is no one-size-fits-all model for collective settlement
design. The specific terms and structure of any particular settle-
ment must take into account the nature of the claims, settlement
objectives of the parties, and the likelihood that the terms will not
obtain sufficient support from plaintiffs to be approved. Thus,
procedures that impose greater risks or costs upon those submitting
claims should generally demand higher claim payments or other
concessions.
To that end, although this section consolidates a variety of
research relevant to audit patterns and identifies the strengths and
weaknesses of the different proposals, it does not attempt to frame
a uniform model of global settlement. Nonetheless, this discussion
209. See, e.g., DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 135, at 25-26.
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suggests, at a minimum, that audits should be mandatory, include
pool selection tied to repeat player claim pools rather than just
claim type, provide for variable degrees of claim inquiry, and in-
corporate a range of sanctions and holdback options. Audits with
substantial future claim submissions should incorporate provisions
that allow administrators to adapt sampling and audit methods to
address changes in filing patterns and discoveries quickly. Alt-
hough others have suggested the use of comparable sampling
mechanisms to aid in determining a defendant's aggregate liability
prior to settlement, 2 10 this discussion highlights their potential ben-
efits in discovering and deterring opportunistic claim development
leading to oversubscription.
1. Mandatory Audit Pools
Audit terms tend to be negotiated prior to the establishment
of a global settlement and largely reflect the parties' respective
interests in the broader settlement. Thus, where defendants are
concerned about the prospects that oversubscription will over-
whelm the settlement, and thereby undermine the settlement, audit
provisions tend to be mandatory and authorize detailed inquiry into
the intrinsic merit of the claims reviewed. Conversely, when de-
fendants are reasonably assured of peace notwithstanding any
oversubscription, audit standards tend to be left to the discretion of
the trust or the lawyers submitting claims to the claim facility. For
example, as previously noted, the fen-phen global settlement ini-
tially contemplated a mandatory audit of one out of every twenty
claims before the court required audits of every claim submitted.21'
By contrast, few of the existing asbestos settlement trusts have
mandatory audit provisions, and most of the largest trusts require
the consent of plaintiff-controlled trust advisory committees21 be-
fore claim audits can occur.2 13
210. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough Justice, (Sept. 23, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id?=1562677.
211. See supra Part II.C.
212. Trust advisory committees play a significant role in setting policy and
overseeing the operation of asbestos bankruptcy trusts. See RAND 2010
REPORT, supra note 64, at xvi ("Trustees are required to obtain the consent of
the trust advisory committee (TAG) (representing current claimants) and the
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To provide an effective deterrent against specious filings,
audits must present a credible threat of discovery. The absence of
mandatory audits provide at least a partial explanation for the sub-
stantial oversubscription to asbestos trusts and the fact that the
practices that flooded those settlements went largely unchallenged
for several years prior to the Silica MDL. Indeed, in virtually eve-
ry other context in which audits are employed to deter undesirable
conduct, mandatory audits of at least some portion of the conduct
to be monitored are the norm. Moreover, given that specious claim
markets are driven by repeat players, the mandatory audit of a frac-
tion of the total claims filed will both limit audit costs and provide
a reasonable deterrent if coupled with other provisions designed to
sanction those found to submit frivolous claims.
2. Random and Stratified Sampling
A common method of balancing the need to monitor the ve-
racity of claims submitted against the costs associated with doing
so is to limit audits to a portion of the claim pool. If the manner of
future claimants' representative (FCR) (representing future claimants) before
major actions by the trust can be taken (such as revising trust distribution proce-
dures, or TDPs)."). As one prominent attorney recently noted, "[T]he selection
of the trustees and members of the trust advisory committees (TACs) that over-
see the operation of the trusts is heavily influenced, if not controlled outright, by
counsel for the asbestos claimants." See Shelley et al., supra note 41, at 261.
Not surprisingly, lawyers from these same firms dominate trust advisory com-
mittee positions, particularly at the largest trusts. See RAND 2010 REPORT,
supra note 64, at 14 & App. B.
213. At least twenty-one trusts (AC&S, Armstrong, ASARCO, AWl, Bab-
cock & Wilcox, Burns and Roe, C.E. Thurston & Sons, Combustion Engineer-
ing, DII, Federal-Mogul, G-I Holdings, H.K. Porter, J.T Thorpe, Kaiser Alumi-
num, Leslie Controls, Owens-Corning, Plibricio, Porter-Hayden, Shook and
Fletcher, THAN, USG, and Western Asbestos), which include the largest trusts
established since 2000, require consent from the trust advisory committee. For
example, section 5.8 of the USG Trust Distribution Procedures provides, in rele-
vant part, "The PI Trust, with the consent of the TAC and the Futures Repre-
sentative, may develop methods for auditing the reliability of medical evidence."
QUIGLEY CO. INC., UNITED STATES GYPSUM: ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY
TRUST DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES 42, http://www.quigleyreorg.com/
ch_1 _pdfs/1451-1500/1488 Exa.pdf. At least eight others (A-Best, A&I, API,
ARTRA, Keene, Manville, Raytech, and UNR) authorize, but do not require,
claim audits.
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selecting claims is predictable, those submitting claims may alter
filing patterns to reduce the chances that their claims, or those
within their inventories that may not withstand scrutiny, will be
audited. To that end, any audit plan must be random and suffi-
ciently spread across the relevant pool to maximize the ratio be-
tween limiting cost, on the one hand, and deterring and disallowing
specious claim submissions on the other.
If the claims submitted are homogenous, random sampling
of an entire claim pool is the most straightforward and ostensibly
fair method of both identifying offending claims and spreading the
risk of audit equally among those advancing claims. When the
population is diverse, however, a random sample of the entire pool
may not sufficiently investigate some sub-pools and excessively
audit claims within others, so stratified sampling 2 14 may be prefer-
able. This ensures that relatively proportionate samples within the
sub-pool are represented and evaluated, which may improve the
potential to discover discrepancies common to the sub-pool and
spread the risk and costs of audit evenly among roughly compara-
ble claims. If stratified sampling is appropriate, the critical ques-
tion is identifying the appropriate subpopulations such that the se-
lected samples reflect sufficiently homogenous sub-pools of the
claims filed.
In stratified sampling, defining audit sub-pools according to
not only claim type but also by professional should improve both
deterrence and disallowance of specious claims. Even if claims
within specific classes are comparable types, the manner in which
the claims are developed and advanced by different claimants can
vary wildly across the sub-pool. On the other hand, repeat players
tend to follow identifiable patterns when developing and advancing
claims,2 15 yielding easily defined sub-pools that are largely ho-
mogenous and providing a basis for testing the veracity of their
submissions in the aggregate by testing a small but representative
sample.
214. Under stratified sampling, claims are broken into discrete strata, with-
in which claims are subjected to random audits.
215. See Brown, supra note 40, at 921 (discussing identifiable common
filing practices across cases among repeat players).
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3. Audit Detail and Inquiry Levels
Balancing the costs and inquiry value of an audit not only
takes place with respect to determining the sample size but also the
degree to which individual claims selected for audit will be inves-
tigated. Thus, audits may vary from requiring modest additional
information to searching investigations of the intrinsic merit of
individual claims and the manner in which the claims were devel-
oped. The appropriate degree of inquiry should thus be guided, at
least in part, by the potential malleability of supporting evidence
and factors suggesting that the claims advanced may not be relia-
ble.
As patterns are revealed over the life of the settlement, ad-
ministrators may modify their audit patterns to account for dis-
cernable distinctions in filing patterns within certain exposure or
injury types and geographic regions. These distinctions, whether
they are inconsistent with actual filing patterns in other regions or
categories or pre-settlement projections with respect to the relevant
sub-pools, may warrant enhanced scrutiny within a portion of the
claim pool long before oversubscription becomes obvious in the
aggregate.
In addition, because key professionals tend to be repeat
players not only within but also across mass tort cases, a repeat
player's broader reputation for veracity in claim submissions is
relevant to the degree to which their claims should be investigated.
Tailoring audit severity to account for a known past offenders'
propensity for employing dubious practices not only enhances the
potential to identify comparably unreliable practices early on but,
over time and across cases, should discourage firms from taking
shortcuts or employing experts who do. This will effectively place
the burden of ensuring veracity on the parties best suited to do so:
the repeat players who control claim development.
4. Sanctions and Repeat Players
Deterrence requires a credible threat of not only discovery
but also sanction. Thus, in order to deter effectively, the costs as-
sociated with discovery of a pattern of specious filings may need to
be far greater than mere rejection of the offending claims. Other-
wise, repeat players may simply view rejection of frivolous claims
as a no-risk proposition. After all, if they do not submit frivolous
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claims, they will certainly not obtain recovery for them. If they do,
however, there is at least some chance that the claims will be paid.
Thus, if the potential aggregate returns on the frivolous claims that
slip through exceed the aggregate costs of submitting them, it is
economically rational to advance the entire inventory of such
claims.
The fact that lawyers and other professionals tend to be re-
peat players involved with multiple claims within a case provides
substantial opportunities for employing meaningful sanctions. For
example, the imposition of mandatory audits across all past and
future submissions by specific offending law firms should encour-
age firms to take greater care in selecting and overseeing those
responsible for generating claims. Moreover, similar provisions
concerning claims supported by evidence generated by repeat of-
fender doctors and screening companies may discourage firms
from employing their services. In either case, the certain delays
associated with mandatory audits alone will effectively reduce the
financial returns of firms that advance unreliable claims and rely
upon unreliable experts and should encourage greater care in claim
and service provider selection.
5. Deferred and Suspended Compensation
A settlement plan that audits only a small fraction of the
pool and pays other claims as they are processed raises the specter
that claimants will dump large volumes of specious claims on the
settlement up front. Those that are selected for audit may not be
paid, but others may be paid before the settlement administrators
identify any issues and adapt their procedures for more effectively
screening weak claims. And once claims are paid, unwarranted
payments tend to be difficult to recover.
In the aggregate, settlements may establish a mandatory
suspended payment trigger if the number of claims submitted ex-
ceed the projected true positive estimates over a given timeframe.
Thus, if the settlement projects X submissions during the initial
claim submission period, this trigger would be automatic if the
aggregate filings exceed X or some percentage above X. This
could be applied to the entire settlement pool, discrete sub-pools
within the settlement, or both. In the absence of deferred payment
until the close of the submission period and suspended payment
upon satisfaction of a trigger, the settlement administrator may be
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contractually obligated to pay claims, even after the data suggest
that the settlement is oversubscribed. By expressly authorizing or
requiring deferred payment until the window for submitting claims
closes and suspension of payments if they exceed the relevant
threshold, this provision would close any gap that might otherwise
arise if administrators are required to seek supplemental authority
before suspending payment.
In addition, suspending payment of submissions by a par-
ticular doctor or firm once they exceed a specific threshold or oth-
erwise qualify for full inventory audits may discourage rampant
oversubscription. Under this approach, payment of claims ad-
vanced by repeat players who submit more than a fixed number of
claims or diagnoses in a submission period may be deferred until
any random audits for the claim pool are completed. Thus, those
who exceed the threshold by filing numerous dubious claims risk
delayed payment, especially if those claims are subjected to a full
mandatory audit, which should encourage those who submit large
numbers of claims to avoid claims that are likely to fail the audit.
Although deferred or suspended payment may also delay
payment for those submitting good claims as well, such an ap-
proach could be tailored in a number of ways. The approach could
streamline these audits, limit the holdback to a portion of the
claims-for example, an amount no greater than a portion of the
attorney's contingency fee-allow a staggered payment schedule
to reduce the effect without undermining the deterrence value of
the audit, or incorporate a bonding option for repeat players in
which they obtain a bond to satisfy any settlement recovery de-
mands for previously compensated specious claims. Repeat play-
ers who develop a reputation for filing specious claims across mass
tort settlements may be priced out of the bonding option or other-
wise suffer enterprise-level sanctions which, in turn, will reduce
the degree to which ignorance of claim quality, either real or as-
serted, is rational. In sum, an up-front deferred payment or bonded
submission system may improve the timing of compensation for
the substantial majority of good and well-developed claims submit-
ted by avoiding the need for more draconian measures down the
road.
Whatever the form, audits and other monitoring schemes
that limit opportunities to exploit collective settlements are a nec-
essary cost that will yield the greatest benefit if they effectively
discourage specious claim recruiting and submissions. Although
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many modem settlements include these measures, some-
particularly asbestos bankruptcy trusts-fall far short of presenting
a credible threat of discovery and sanction. And notwithstanding
the fact that even well designed audits have failed to deter specious
claim markets in all cases, their absence invites targeted develop-
ment with little care for whether the claims have intrinsic merit.
6. Adaptable Sampling and Flexibility
Given the adaptability of claim recruiting and development
markets, audit procedures that are fixed by settlement terms at the
outset lend themselves to obsolescence once the settlement begins
processing claims. If we assume that audits are merely reviewing
claims that were developed pre-settlement, this potential may not
be a significant problem. Where claim development can adapt in
response to sampling or other audit rules, however, administrators
may not be equipped to identify or react to these adaptations in a
timely manner, particularly where the settlement may be read to
require court approval before making any such changes. To that
end, initial settlement design should not only incorporate learning
about claims and practices derived pre-settlement but also mecha-
nisms to continue this learning and adaptation during the life of the
settlement.
D. The Judicial Role in Aggregate Settlement Administration
Judges play a critical role in establishing the legitimacy of
an aggregate settlement. To bind class members, for example,
Rule 23(e)(2) specifically requires a judicial finding that the set-
tlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" following a fairness
hearing.216 Likewise, section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code con-
ditions the entry of a channeling injunction-the centerpiece of an
asbestos reorganization plan-on the court's finding that "the trust
will operate through mechanisms . . . that provide reasonable as-
surance that the trust will value, and be in a financial position to
pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar claims
in substantially the same manner."217 Even in the absence of an
express rule or statutory requirement, judicial approval is desirable
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
217. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006).
Vol. 42626
Specious Claims and Global Settlements
as a means of demonstrating that a settlement is the product of a
fair and open process.
Nonetheless, hearings concerning the approval of global
settlements tend to marginalize consideration of the practical ele-
ments of settlement administration generally and the likelihood
that the settlement will be overrun by dubious claims specifically.
This is not surprising inasmuch as potential objectors are frequent-
ly unhappy plaintiffs, who are concerned with their own compen-
sation rather than the long-term risk of settlement depletion. De-
fendants have presumably negotiated monitoring terms as part of
the larger settlement discussions, but the risk of oversubscription
may be of little concern when the defendants' costs are fixed.
Likewise, the plaintiffs' firms that support the settlement have little
interest in creating more hoops for themselves or their referral
firms to jump through. Finally, as seen in dozens of asbestos bank-
ruptcies since the adoption of section 524(g), legal representatives
for future claimants focus primarily on maximizing assets obtained
from defendants and insurers rather than insisting upon strict moni-
toring of the claims submitted by the lawyers who effectively con-
trol their appointments. 2 18
This failure is particularly problematic in global settlements
where absent tort victims' recoveries will be limited to a fixed
fund. Current plaintiffs and their counsel have no interest in em-
bracing provisions that may delay or preclude their own recoveries,
and defendants have no incentive to insist upon verification mech-
anisms when their own liability is fixed. Thus, even if the parties
before the court agree that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and
adequate," a settlement plan that lacks sufficient verification
mechanisms to deter rampant oversubscription will not be so for
claimants who must proceed against an increasingly depleted set-
tlement fund over time. In these situations, adequacy is not a snap-
shot as of the settlement; it is a question of whether the settlement
plan as a whole is fair, reasonable, and adequate throughout its
operation.
218. Brown, supra note 40, at 190.
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V. CONCLUSION
Specious claim markets arise not only because some bad
apples find it profitable to exploit gaps in settlement design but
also because the focus on these bad apples overlooks group dy-
namics that weaken informal checks on specious claim submis-
sions in traditional litigation. Predictable settlement evidentiary
targets generate opportunities and incentives for repeat players to
develop and present intrinsically bad mass tort claims as good. If
we assume that bad apples are primarily responsible for these
claims, limiting the opportunities to exploit settlement terms and
elevating the sanctions associated with doing so should be suffi-
cient to deter specious filings. This assumption, however, is in-
consistent with what we know about similarly corrupt practices in
virtually every other institutional or group context, and the absence
of self-knowledge-that is, that the actor realizes that the action or
practice is corrupt-limits the potential impact of common oppor-
tunity- and incentive-based controls alone.
Notwithstanding these limitations, understanding the poten-
tial issues in collective settlement also suggests more adaptable
and targeted solutions. These include not only framing criteria to
account for potential malleability and manipulation but also an
adaptive monitoring system that targets the relevant groups, sub-
groups, and individuals responsible for advancing claims. Specifi-
cally, sampling methods should focus not only on global claim
patterns, but also the patterns employed by specific repeat players,
incorporate mechanisms for refinement to identify and account for
new techniques and strategies for generating claims, and afford
settlement administrators with the tools necessary to avoid or re-
cover payments on account of specious claims. At the same time,
settlement forms and communications may be improved by ensur-
ing that deterrence and compliance messages are effectively com-
municated to the appropriate sub-groups and individuals.
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